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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case involves a dispute over the boundary between appellant Jennifer 
Harvey's property ("Harvey Property") and respondents Robert and Alexis Read's property 
("Read Property"). The pertinent deed refers to "the creek" and "the centerline of the main 
tributary to the creek" as the boundary between the two properties, and the dispute centers 
around the precise identity and location of that creek as of the time of sale of one of the two 
properties by a common owner in 1972. 
B. Course Of Proceedings 
This case is before this Court for the second time on appeal. The Reads filed their 
quiet title action in 1999, after which Harvey filed her answer and counterclaim. Clerk's Record 
in Case No. 3 1152 (hereinafter "Aug. R."), pp. 1-15; 16-21. In an order dated March 26,2002, 
the district court granted summary judgment to the Reads. Aug. R., pp. 116-1 19. Harvey filed a 
motion h r  reconsideration and a motion for relief kom judgment, both of which were denied by 
the trial court. Aug. R., p. 120-159. 
Harvey appealed. Her appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
In an unpublished decision, that court affirmed the district court's decision. Limited Clerk's 
Record filed December 28,2007 (hereinafter "R."), Val. N, pp. 667-78. Harvey then petitioned 
the Idaho Supreme Cotut for review. In a decision issued on May 18,2005, the Supreme Court 
reversed the district court, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
proper location of the boundary. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that: 
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The language of the deeds in this case is ambiguous in relation to 
the land they purport to convey. None of the proposed boundary 
lines unambiguously fit the language contained in the deeds. The 
intentions of the parties to the conveyance instruments in 
guestion are consequentlv unclear and must be determined as 
questions of fact with reference to the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. 
Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497,500, 112 P.3d 785,788 (2005) (emphasis added). 
Following remand from the Supreme Court, the district court conducted a bench 
trial on August 21 through 23,2006. On September 1,2006, the district court issued its 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law. R., Val. 111, pp. 541-56. 
Included among the conclusions of law in that Memorandum were the following: 
8. Plaintiffs Robert and Alexis Read are entitled to judgment 
as against defendant Jemiifer Harvey, quieting title to the property 
on their side of Little Gold Creek as it currently flows. This is the 
same location as Little Gold Creek flowed in 1'972. 
9. To comply with Idaho law, Little Gold Creek must be 
surveyed over the course it serves as the common boundary 
between the Read Property and the Harvey Property, such distance 
extending the northerly pin placed near the creek by Tucker 
Engineering in its 1977 survey for Don Schull (Trial Exhibit 9) and 
the southerly pin set near the creek by Tucker Engineering in its 
1997 survey (Trial Exhibit 10). 
10. In the exercise of its equitable powers, the Court concludes 
that defendant Iiarvey should bear the cost of such survey and 
directs that the same be completed within 60 days of the date 
hereof. . . . 
11. Plaintiffs are deemed to be the prevailing parties for 
purposes of IRCP 54(d). Furthermore, after no later than 
February 7,2002, the date Jerry VauOoyen's affidavit was filed, 
Harvey's defense of this lawsuit and prosecution of her 
counterclaim has been frivolous, because as of that date Harvey 
has known of the original landowner's (Andersens') intent as 
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stated by Andersens' agent Jerry VanOoyen, and Harvey has never 
obtained any evidence to the contrary of the original landowner's 
(Andersen's) intent. 
R., Vol. IIL, p. 555 (Appendix A). 
On September 8, 2006, the trial court entered an Interim Judgment on the basis of 
these findings and conclusions. R., Vol. IV, pp. 648-54. That same day, the Reads filed a 
Motion for Order Awarding Fees and Costs and a Memorandum of Costs and Fees. R., Vol. 111, 
pp. 557-62. On September 13 and 14,2006, Harvey filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Interim Judgment on the grounds that the trial court's conclusion 
that Harvey's defense of the lawsuit "has been frivolous" since "no later than February 7, 2002," 
was contrary to the prior appellate decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. R., Vol. N, 
pp. 658-66; 679-84. Harvey also filed an objection to the Reads' motion for attorneys' fees. 
R., Vol. N, pp. 696-71 1. 
In an order dated December 19,2006, district court reluctantly conceded that it 
erred in finding that Harvey's defense of the lawsuit had been "frivolous" since before the time 
of her first successful appeal and that the court was without authority to award the Reads their 
attorneys' fees from the time they filed their motion for summary judgment through the date of 
the remittitur from the Supreme Court. R., Vol. IV, pp. 781-801. The court nevertheless 
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awarded the Reads their attorneys' fees incurred from October 3,2005,' through the end of trial 
based, in part, upon the following findings and coilclusions: 
From a factual standpoint, the Motion for Reconsideration 
(of the court's finding that Harvey's defense of the lawsuit had 
been frivolous) must be denied. As soon as Harvey was involved 
in this lawsuit, she injected her own ambiguity into the deed. That 
ambiguity did not truly exist . . . . VanOoyen's affidavit detailed 
how he was retained by Dick D. Andersen and Nancy L. Andersen, 
the owners of all this land, to subdivide and market the Andersen's 
property, and how he used "the centerline of the main channel of 
Little Gold Creek which traversed the property as a boundary." 
VanOoyen also stated unequivocally that the main channel of 
Little Gold Creek was intended to be the boundary between what 
are now the Read and Harvey properties and is depicted as channel 
"A" on the Tucker Engineering Survey, and that he is "positive 
that Little Gold Creek did not flow through the ditch labeled as 'B' 
on the Tucker Engineering Survey at any time relevant to this 
proceeding." 
The Supreme Court then noted the parties disagree as to 
what "the drafters of the original deeds intended to invoke" when 
referring to "the creek" in the deeds, either "Channel A, a drainage 
ditch which has consistently during the times in question canied 
water, or the comparatively dry historical natural creek channel is a 
question of fact that precludes summary judgment." The Supreme 
Court made reference to VanOoyen's affidavit. Since that affidavit 
stated exactly what "the drafters of the original deeds intended to 
invoke," this Court can only assume that the Idaho Supreme Court 
simply failed to keep in mind the uncontroverted evidence of 
VanOoyen, the only evidence of the drafters' intent. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the first instance apparently 
did not discern that Harvey used Meniam Webster to inject 
' This is the date that the Reads served Harvey with their first set of requests for 
admission following the remand of this matter from the Supreme Court to the district court on 
May 18,2005. 
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ambiguity to (sic) this deed. In the second instance the Idaho 
Supreme Court, in analyzing this deed made ambiguous only by 
Merriam Webster, did not appear to appreciate that the only and 
uncontradicted intent of the grantor, was through VanOoyen. The 
trial court (and appellate courts) should consider "extrinsic 
evidence of the circumstances and intentions of the original 
parties" to the instrument. The only evidence of the grantors' 
intent was through the grantors' agent Jerry VanOoyen . . . . 
. . . The Court has reviewed the briefing to the Idaho Court 
of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court. While this Court finds 
no purposeful deception by Ilarvey to the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court, Harvey certainly continued her baseless argument 
that the Andersens must have meant to subdivide these parcels 
along a historically dry riverbed. Harvey's argument is baseless in 
light of VanOoyen's affidavit. The Idaho Court of Appeals did not 
buy into this baseless argument. For some reason, the Idaho 
Supreme Court was apparently confused by the argument. The 
question then is: "Can the Idaho Supreme Court decision cause 
there to be no frivolous defense of this lawsuit as a matter of law?' 
R., Val. rV, pp. 781-801 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (Appendix B). 
From here, the district court determined that "(w)hile the Reads and this Court 
may not understand that decision given VanOoyen's uncontradicted affidavit, by operation of 
law the Idaho Supreme Court's decision causes Harvey's defense to not be frivolous." 
R., Val. IV, p. 790. The district court nevertheless awarded the Reads' their attorneys' fees 
through trial on the grounds that, following remand of this matter to the district court for the 
completion of discovery and trial, none of the responses submitted by Harvey to Reads' Requests 
for Admission were "based upon a reasonable belief in prevailing on the issue" at trial. 
R., Val. N., pp. 793-95. The district courted entered its Final Judgment on May 14, 2007. 
R., Val. V, p. 833. Harvey filed her notice of appeal on June 22,2007. R., Val. V, p. 840. 
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C. Statement Of Facts 
Appellant Jennifer Harvey ("Harvey") and Respondents Robert and Alexis Read 
(the "Reads") own adjacent properties in Bonner County, Idaho. Both properties were originally 
part of a larger 160-acre tract owned by Dick and Nancy Andersen (the "Andersens"). Tr., p. 64, 
LL. 1-4; p. 65, L. 9 to p. 66, L. 5. In 1972, the Andersens sought the assistance of real estate 
broker, Jerry VanOoyen, to divide and sell their property as 14 separate parcels. Tr., p. 66, L. 23 
through p. 67, L. 9; Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit ("Pls.' Ex.") 7.2 
The Andersens' property was traversed by a watercourse known as the Little Gold 
Creek. Tr., p. 68, LL. 2-8. In assisting the Andersens with the sale of their property, 
Mr. VanOoyen recommended that Little Gold Creek be designated as the boundary between 11 
of the 14 parcels. Tr., p. 69 L. 5 top. 70, L. 8. Mr. VanOoyen then prepared the following 
hand-drawn depiction of the 160-acre parcel for use as a marketing diagram of the various 
parcels: 
2 There is no recorded subdivision plat associated with the individual sale of these 
parcels. 
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Pls.' Ex. 8 [text box not in original] (hereinafter referred to as Figure 1) (Appendix c ) . ~  
The property currently owned by the Reads is generally depicted on this drawing 
as Parcels 3,6, and 8, and the property currently owned by Harvey is generally depicted on this 
drawing as Parcels 12, 11, and a portion of Parcel 10. Tr., p. 232, L. 7 to p. 237, L. 14; Pls.' 
Ex. 8. The Reads purchased Parcel 6 in 1981, Parcel 8 in 1987, and Parcel 3 in March 1997. 
Aug. R., p. 55, Exs. A, B and C; Tr., p. 232, L. 21 to p. 233, L. 23. Harvey purchased the 
property she owns in Parcels 10, 11, and 12 in 1993. Tr., p. 235, LL. 1-3. It is the boundary 
between Parcel 3 and Parcels 11 and 12 that is the subject of this appeal. 
This depiction is not drawn to scale, denotes only approximate acreages and 
boundaries, and was represented to buyers as being subject to owner survey. Pls.' Ex. 8 
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The boundary description in Harvey's 1972 predecessor deed between the 
Andersens and Frank Boss describes her boundary line as follows: 
The N%N%SW%NW%, lying Westerly of the creek, and the 
SW%NW%W%, all in Section 12, Township 58 North, Range 1 
West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, and a portion of the 
SE%NW%NW% of Section 12, Township 58 North, Range 1 
West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, described as 
follows: Beginning at the Southwest comer of said subdivision, 
thence North along the West boundary of said SE%NW%NW% to 
the centerline of the main tributary to the creek; thence Southerly 
along said centerline to the South boundary to the point of 
beginning. . . . 
Defendant's Trial Exhibit ("Def.'~ Ex.") WULiTJ (emphasis added). 
The first lcnown survey of the disputed properly was conducted in 1977 by Tucker 
Engineering at the request of former property owner, Don ~ c h u l l . ~  Tr., p. 549, L. 6 to p. 551, 
L. 4; Pls.' Ex. 9. Mr. Schull wanted to set the comers of his property as part of a plan of 
subdivision. Id. Mr. Schull did not commission Tucker Engineering to survey the creek 
location. Id.; Def.'s Ex. JJ. For that reason, the surveyors set only two points on the survey 
related to the creek location. Id. The draftsman simply "drew in" an arc connecting the two set 
points and labeled it "creek" on the survey. Id. This 'arc does not depict an actual surveyed line 
of the creek. Id. 
On March 10, 1997, the Reads bought Parcel 3 from Jon Mason pursuant a 
warranty deed containing the following legal description: 
All that property lying in the Northwest quarter of the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter AND all that property lying in the 
Don Schull is a predecessor in title to the Harvey property, 
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Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest 
quarter Section 12 T58N R1 W, BM lying North and East of the 
creek BEGINNING at a point 165 feet East of the Northwest 
comer of the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of the 
Northwest quarter thence South a distance of 180 feet thence West 
a distance of 165 feet thence Southwesterly at 21 6 (degrees) to 
the centerline of the creek thence Northerly along the centerline of 
the creek to the South line of the Southeast quarter of the 
Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest 
quarter thence Easterly to the point of beginning. An area of 
approximately 4.3 acres. 
Def.'s Ex. E (emphasis added). On or around August 1997, the Reads commissioned a survey of 
the southern boundary of Parcel 3 (also hereinafter referred to as the Mason Property) by Tucker 
Engineering. Pls.' Ex. 10; Def.'s Ex. JJ. 
In conducting this survey, Tucker Engineering did not undertake to locate the 
"centerline of the creek" called out by the deed, because "Mr. Read and Mr. Mason had agreed to 
where their land exchange boundary would be for a boundary line adjustment, and those 
locations were shown to us in the field. and the field crew staked the rebar that would be shown 
as lines L2, L1 and then another one that runs south and west to a line that's labeled creek 
(Channel A)." Tr., p. 388, LL. 12-18 (surveyor, Gilbert Bailey); Def.'s Ex. JJ. Mr. Bailey 
further testified with regard to the surveyed location of the boundary as follows: 
Q. . . . You testified on - under direct examination that our 
direction was to fine up the power pole with another location. Do 
you recall that testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Who gave you that direction? 
A. Mr. Read. 
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Q. Okay. Did he explain why the power pole was the point of 
reference? 
A. Well, actually there a copy of a map in my file that shows a 
sketch that he had made in agreement with Mr. Mason as to where 
the boundaries were going to be, shows a power pole on it, line 
running through it so we located that power pole and extended - 
this was just field staked, the exchange between Mason and Read, 
and what I mean by "field staked" is that we'd gone in the field 
and at points had identified to us the points the parties had interest 
in and set rebar and recorded their locations relative to the rest of 
the boundary and then prepared this map from that data. 
Tr., p. 398, L. 6 to p. 399, L. 1. The southwestern boundary of Parcel 3 that was agreed upon by 
Mason and Read was the location of an existing drainage ditch that would later come to be 
identified as "Channel A" (discussed below). 
Based on the selection by Mr. Read and Mr. Mason of this ditch ("Channel A") as 
the common boundary line of their property with the H m e y  Property, Tucker Engineering 
determined that the creek lay 337.29 feet from the last measured comer on the Mason Property. 
A Record of Survey for the property was filed accordingly on September 5, 1997. Def.'s Ex. JJ; 
Pls.' Ex. 10. As with the 1977 survey, the remaining location of the creek forming the boundary 
to the properties was simply "sketched in" by the draftsman. Tr., p. 552, LL. 16-19. 
Based on the results of this survey, the Reads recorded, on September 3, 1997, the 
following amended legal description for the Mason Property (Parcel 3): 
All that property lying in the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter AND all that property lying in 
the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 12 Township 58 North, Range 1 West, Boise 
Meridian, Banner County Idaho, lying North and East of the creek. 
BEGINNING at a point 165 East of the Northwest comer of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest 
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Quarter; thence South a distance of 180 feet; thence West a 
distance of 96.00 feet; thence South 48 idegrees) 32' 59" West 
337.29 feet, more or less, to the centerline of the crek; thence 
Northerly along the centerline of the creek to the South line of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter; thence Easterly to the point of Beginuing. An area of 
approximately 4.3 acres. 
Def.'s Ex. E (emphasis added). 
When Harvey objected to the recordation of the September 5, 1997 Record of 
Survey containing the boundary line as agreed upon by Read and Mason, Tucker Engineering 
filed an amendment to its Record of Survey acknowledging that the location of the "creek" 
identified in its prior survey was disputed by a neighboring property owner. Def.'s Ex. CC-5. In 
December 1997, Tucker Engineering also performed a topographical survey of the meadow in an 
effort to more accurately locate the "centerline of the creek" called out in the deeds. Pls.' Ex. 11. 
That survey appears in the record as follows: 
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(hereinafter referred to as Figure 2) (text boxes not in original) (Appendix D). The lines marked 
as Channels A, B, and C were identified by Tucker Engineering as existing "drainage channels" 
located inside the meadow. Pls.' Ex. 11. Channel A is the location of the existing drainage ditch 
selected by Mason and Read as the boundary between Parcel 3 (now owned by the Reads) and 
Parcels 11 and 12 (owned by Harvey) that appears on the August 1997 Record of Survey. 
Although Tucker Engineering's efforts to identifj and locate the "centerline to the 
creek" were ultimately "inconclusive," (Def.'s Ex. JJ), the Reads filed their quiet title action 
in 1999 asserting that the boundary to their property lay in the location of Channels A and C as 
depicted on the December 1997 topographical survey. See, e.g., Aug. R., p. 138. Harvey 
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disputed this claim, asserting that the boundary to the properties lie either in the location of 
Channel B, or in the location of an historical streambed located northeast of Channel B. 
In order to fully understand the content of the witness's testimony and 
documentary evidence that was offered at trial, the disputed "triangular area" depicted on the 
Tucker survey must be viewed within the context of the entire Little Gold Creek drainage basin, 
as shown by the following topographical survey prepared by Glahe & Associates Professional 
Land Surveyors in September 2001: 
Def.'s Exs. MM and QQQQQ (hereinafter referred to as Figure 3) [text boxes not in original] 
(Appendix E). The triangular-shaped disputed area claimed by the Reads appears at the bottom 
of the survey. It is marked with vertical lines and labeled to show the location of Channel A, 
Channel B, and Channel C for the Court's convenience. Directly to the north of this triangle are 
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two nearly parallel nortwsouth running channels. For purposes of this appeal, the nortwsouth 
channel to the west is identified Channel D, and the noith/south channel to the east is identified 
Channel E.' 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court e n  as a matter of law in relying on the testimony of Jerry 
VanOoyen to establish the intent of the parties to the BossIAndersen deed? 
B. Is there substantial and competent evidence of record to support the district 
court's finding that the parties to the BossIAndersen deed intended that the 
described creek boundary be located in the current location of Channels A and C? 
C. Did the district court err as a matter of law in ruling that the fact that water was 
flowing in Channel A as of 1972 constituted "the law of the case"? 
D. Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering Harvey to provide and pay 
for a survey of Little Gold Creek as part of its entry ofjudgment in favor of the 
Reads? 
E. Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding the Reads their attorneys' 
fees from October 3, 2005, through trial? 
111. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
With regard to questions of law, this Court exercises plenary review. Idaho 
Forest Xndus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake WatershedImp. Dist., 135 Idaho 316,319, 17 P.3d 260,263 
(2000) ("[Tlhis Court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its 
own conclusions from the facts presented."). In contrast, a trial court's findings of fact will not 
be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 
Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 52(a). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly 
' Channel E is currently in the location of what Harvey claimed at trial was the location 
of the historical streambed that marked the intended boundary to the properties. 
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erroneous if they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence of record. Id. 
Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in 
determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Relying On The Testimony 
Of Jerry VanOoyen To Establish The Intent Of The Parties To The 1972 
BossIAndersen Deed 
Upon remand of this matter to the district court for trial, the lower court was 
tasked with the duty to determine the intentions of the parties to 1972 deed "as questions of fact 
with reference to the surrounding facts and circumstances." Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 112 
P.3d 785 (2005). Given this procedural posture, "[tlhe parties should [have] be[en] permitted to 
reopen and introduce any additional relevant evidence on the question of intent that they may 
have." Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854,858,673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). 
Despite its directive from this Court to reopen the record at trial to hear and 
consider all competent evidence reasonably probative of the issue of the parties' intent, the 
district refused to consider any evidence of the intent of the parties to the 1972 deed except that 
upon which it had previously relied in entering summary judgment to the Reads -the testimony 
of real estate broker, Jeny VanOoyen. R., Val. IV, pp. 783-88. In fact, the district court 
repeatedly found this evidence to be "[tlhe only evidence of the grantors' intent" that was offered 
at trial. Id. (emphasis in original) 
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1. The District Court's Exclusive Reliance On The Testimony Of The 
Agent For The Grantors Constitutes An Error Of Law 
The district court's exclusive reliance upon the testimony of Mr. VanOoyen as 
"evidence of the grantors' intent" constitutes an error of law because it is not just the grantors' 
intent that controls in this case - it is the intention of the parties to the conveyance that must be 
determined. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497,112 P.3d 785 (2005). 
As a party to the original 1972 deed, Frank Boss' testimony regarding the location 
of the creek boundary at the time he purchased his land from the Andersens was relevant to, if 
not dispositive of, a determination as to what the parties intended when they selected "the creek" 
and "the centerline of the main tributary to the creek" as the boundary to the Boss property. See 
Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,89,245 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1952); Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 
112,268 P.2d 351 (1954) (holding that evidence of a seller's acquiescence to a buyer's 
occupation of later disputed property is "competent evidence" of an agreement to fix a boundary 
not otherwise clearly established by the deed). Thus, the district court's repeated conclusion 
that: "The only evidence of the grantors' intent was tlvough the grantors' agent Jerry 
VanOoyen," is erroneous as a matter of law and warrants reversal of the entry ofjudgment in 
favor of the Reads. 
2. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Relying On The 
Testimony Of A Witness That Was Not Competent To Testify 
Not only was it error for the district court to rely exclusively on the testimony of 
Mr. VanOoyen to establish the parties' intent, it was error for the court to rely on this evidence at 
all in the absence of adequate foundation as to Mr. VanOoyen's competency to testify with 
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regard to the circumstances surrounding the 1972 BossIAndersen deed. Although Mr. 
VanOoyen testified generally regarding the design of his marketing scheme for the Andersen 
parcels, there is no evidence of record that Mr. VanOoyen participated in any way in either the 
negotiation or execution of the deed between the Andersens and Frank Boss. Tr., p. 66, 
LL. 3-19; p. 69 L. 10 top. 70, L. 8. 
To the contrary, Mr. VanOoyen expressly testified at trial that he did not walk the 
boundary lines with Frank Boss at the time of Mr. Boss' purchase of those lots: 
A. Oh, naturally, after it's laid out and John Engwar does his 
work and stakes it all in showing the properties to clientele, you 
are walking over most, not all of them because we have other 
agents, too, who might be selling the property, and as a matter of 
fact, when Frank Boss bought hispiece, uh, he was a client of 
mine, also knew the Andersens, he just went out on his own and, 
uh - because he had bought land and stuff before. I never even 
walked over theproperty with him. 
Q. [On cross examination] You also stated that you recall 
specifically not showing Frank Boss the property that he purchased 
from the Andersens; is that right? 
A. Yes. I'm positive of that. 
Tr., p. 72, L. 18 to p. 73, L. 4 (emphasis added); Tr., p. 87, LL. 6-9. No adequate foundation 
having been laid with regard to Mr. VanOoyen's ability to testify regarding the circumstances of 
the AndersenIBoss conveyance or the intention of the parties with regard to the identification of 
the creek boundary called out in the deed, it was error for the district court to rely on this 
testimony as evidence of the intent of the parties to that deed. 
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3. The District Court Erred In Disregarding The Testimony Of Frank 
Boss, The Only Party To The BossfAndersen Deed To Testify At Trial 
Frank Boss is Harvey's predecessor in title.6 At trial, Mr. Boss testified that he 
purchased Parcels 10, 11, and 12 from the Andersens in September 1972 and owned the property 
until October 1974. Tr., p. 642, LL. 7-14. Mr. Boss testified that, prior to purchasing his 
property from the Andersens, he was personally familiar with the location of the waterways on 
the property because he used to hike along the creek in order to go fishing in the Lower Beaver 
Pond. Tr., p. 642, LL. 19-25. Mr. Boss testified that in 1972 there was "a stream that came out 
of the alders I suppose, whatever the vegetation was in there below the beaver pond, that lined 
with the edge of the fields which were my fields and where the mowing was done for hay. 
There's a little stream that went very near the edge of those woods, and so it's that stream." Tr., 
p. 643, LL. 2-7. 
Mr. Boss built a cabin on the property in the spring of 1973. Tr., p. 647, L. 19 to 
p. 648, L. 5.7 Because this cabin did not have running water, Mr. Boss had to get his water out 
of the creek. Tr., p. 643, L. 21 to p. 644, L. l l .  To do this, Mr. Boss dug a six-foot deep 
watering hole approximately 20 to 30 feet from the creek. Tr., p. 643, L. 21 top. 644, L. 1; 
p. 644, LL. 17-24; p. 645, LL. 5-1 1; Tr., p. 646, LL. 12-15. Water entered the watering hole 
through a small diversion channel and then flowed back into the creek through a return channel. 
As the BossIAndersen deed is the only original deed of record that relates to the 
disputed property, it is the circumstances of the conveyance of this particular instrument that is 
dispositive of the parties' rights in this case. 
This cabin was constructed in the same location where Harvey's house stands today. 
See Figure 3 on p. 13, supra. 
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Tr., p. 644, L. 23 top. 645, L. 1. This watering hole was located next to the "little creek that had 
come out of the heaver ponds that wound along the edge of the field." Tr., p. 644, LL. 6-8. At 
trial, the location of this watering hole was marked by Mr. Boss on Figure 3 as follows: 
(Appendix F). Mr. Boss testified at trial that he believed the location of the boundary to his 
property to be generally in the area where he dug his water hole. Tr., p. 652, LL. 15-24. 
Mr. Boss also marked the location of his watering hole on the 1983 aerial 
photograph admitted as Pls.' Ex. 16 (Appendix G). Again, the location of Mr. Boss' watering 
hole as marked on that photograph directly contradicts the Reads' theory that the parties to the 
BossIAndersen deed intended the boundary to Mr. Boss' property to be in the location of 
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Channel A. As the only party to the 1972 deed to testify at trial, it was legal error for the district 
court to refuse to rely on Mr. Boss' testimony with regard to the intent of tlte parties to that deed. 
B. The District Court Erred In Entering Judgment For The Reads Because 
There Is No Substa~ltial Or Credible Evidence Of Record To Support A 
Finding That Channel A Carried Water From Little Gold Creek Or That 
Channel C Even Existed In 1972 
1. The Reads Bore The Burden Of Proof To Show That The Parties To 
The BosslAndersen Deed Intended The Described Creek Boundary 
To Be In The Current Location Of Channels A And C 
"It is well settled under Idaho case law that the party seeking to quiet title against 
another must succeed on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of that of his 
adversary." Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31,624 P.2d 413 (1981); Independence Placer Mining 
Co. v. Hellman, 62 Idaho 180, 109 P.2d 1038 (1941) ("plaintiffmust recover on the strength of 
his own title which must be established by satisfactory, affirmative proofs; he can not recover on 
the weakness of his adversary's title"); Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 106 Idaho 280,678 P.2d 72 
(Ct.App. 1984). Thus, in order to prevail at trial on their claim to the disputed area, it was not 
enough for the Reads to show that Harvey failed to establish the existence of an historical 
streambed in the location of Channel E as alleged in her counterclaim. Rather, the Reads bore 
the affirmative burden of proving their legal title to the disputed area based on the strength of 
evidence that the parties to the BosslAndersen deed intended to place the boundary to the 
properties in the current location of Channels A and C. 
In order to carry this burden, the Reads needed to prove (1) that Channel B had, 
since at least 1972, not carried any water from Channel D; (2) that Channel C existed and carried 
water from Channel D in 1972; and (3) that Channel A carried water from Channel C in 1972. 
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Failing these proofs, the Reads are not entitled to a judgment quieting title in them to the 
property they claim. The following testimony of record demonstrates that there is no substantial 
or competent evidence of record that Channel C was in existence in 1972. 
2. The Testimony Of Jerry VanOoyen Does Not Establish The Existence 
Of Channel C Or That Channel A Carried Water From Little Gold 
Creek In 1972 
The record testimony of Jerry VanOoyen begins with a sworn affidavit executed 
by him on January 4,2001 (the "First VanOoyen Affidavit"). Aug. R., pp. 62-66.8 tn this 
affidavit, Mr. VanOoyen testifies that he was the broker that designed the division of the 160. 
acre tract owned by the Andersens in 1972; that he selected Little Gold Creek as the legal 
boundary for 11 of the 14 parcels; that his hand-drawn depiction of the boundary of the various 
parcels was drawn fiom his personal familiarity with the area and a review of available aerial 
photographs; and that this depiction was used in connection with his marketing efforts. Aug. R., 
In paragraph 5 of the First VanOoyen Affidavit, Mr. VanOoyeil attests that: 
I had occasion to show various parcels in the Andersen subdivision 
a number of times to prospective purchasers in the early 1970's. 
At the time, the main channel of Little Gold Creek ran near the 
westerly edge of the bottomlands towards what is now Jennifer 
Harvey's property. To the east of the channel was open land with 
the tree line being some distance away. The centerline of that 
channel was intended to be the boundary between the properties 
now owned by Mr. and Mrs. Read and Ms. Harvey. 
Aug. R., p. 63. In paragraph 6 of the First VanOoyen Affidavit, Mr. VanOoyen attests that: 
This affidavit was filed with the district court on February 7,2002. Hence its reference 
by the district court as the February 7, 2002 Affidavit of Jerry VanOoyen. R., Val. ITI., p. 555. 
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In late 1998, I was asked to visit the disputed area between the 
Read and Harvey parcels. In the process, I was also shown a 
survey prepared by Tucker Engineering that depicted a channel of 
Little Gold Creek and a ditch which were marked "A" and "B", 
respectively. Based on my inspection of the property in 1998, I 
can say that the main channel of Little Gold Creek is in the same 
location as it was in 1972 when the Andersens' property was 
subdivided. That location has not changed to any marked degree 
in the last 28 years. 
Aug. R., p. 63. In paragraph 7 of the First VanOoyen Affidavit, Mr. VanOoyen attests that: 
The main channel of Little Gold Creek that was intended to he the 
boundary between what are now the Read and Harvey properties is 
channel "A" as depicted on the Tucker Engineering survey. I am 
also positive that Little Gold Creek did not flow through the ditch 
labeled as "B" on the Tucker Engineering survey at any time 
relevant to this proceeding. Channel "A" is what is shown on the 
inap I drew [Pls. Ex. 81 and is the boundary I pointed out to 
prospective purchasers. 
Aug. R., p. 63. 
Virtually all of the testimony given by Mr. VanOoyen in paragraphs 5,6, and 7 of 
the First VanOoyen Affidavit is directly contradicted by testimony given by Mr. VanOoyen in a 
second affidavit dated June 14,2002 (the "Second VanOoyen Affidavit"). Aug. R., pp. 132-42. 
In this affidavit, Mr. VanOoyen attests as follows: 
5. . . . At the time that I was involved in the marketing of the 
Andersen Property, the Andersen Property was also traversed by a 
linear man made drainage ditch. The man made drainage ditch 
was located westerly of the main channel of Little Gold Creek and 
the main channel of Little Gold Creek lay easterly of the linear 
man made drainage ditch. 
6 .  . . . My familiarity of the physical topography of the 
Andersen Property, particularly as it relates to the main channel of 
the Little Gold Creek was limited due to the fact of the heavily 
vegetated meadow created difficulties in actually walking the 
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Andersen Property for the establishment of boundary lines . . . 
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is another copy orthe marketing 
diagram. I have circled on the diagram an area of uncertainty as to 
the location of a portion of the main channel of Little Gold Creek 
in relation to the common boundary between Parcels 10 and 6 . . . 
I have also noted on Exhibit B the general location of the linear 
man made ditch referenced above. 
9. 1 have noted a mistake in paragraph 7 of my first affidavit, 
pursuant to [sic] my first affidavit I stated that channel "A" as 
depicted on the Tucker Survey was the main channel of Little Gold 
Creek and that channel "B" was a ditch through which the main 
channel of Little Gold Creek never flowed. This is incorrect due to 
the transposition of the letters. What is correct is that channel 
"B"is what I have always considered to be the main channel of 
Little Gold Creek and that channel "A"is the linear man made 
ditch referenced above. Channel "B" as depicted on the Tucker 
Survey is the boundary lpointed out to theprospective 
purchasers of the Andersen Property . . . 
11. . . . Based on my recollection, my physical inspection of the 
real property that is the subject of this lawsuit and Exhibits A, B, C 
and D, I believe that: 
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a. The circled area on Exhibit E generally corresponds 
with the circled area noted on Exhibit B. The area circled on 
Exhibit E depicts what I understood to be the common boundary 
line between Lots 10 and 6 with the aforementioned discrepancy. 
b. The hatched line on Exhibit E corresponds to 
Channel B on the Tucker Survey and which I understood to be the 
main channel of Little Gold Creek at the time that I made the 
marketing diagram and which I pointed out to the prospective 
purchasers of the Andersen Property. 
c. The "x'd" line on Exhibit E corresponds to Channel 
A on the Tucker survey and which is the main ditch referenced 
above and which I understood not to be the coinrnon boundary at 
the time that I made the marketing diagram. 
Aug. R., pp. 133-141 (emphasis in original) (Appendix H). 
At trial, Mr. VanOoyen again testified that he was the designer of the 1972 
property division and that he chose Little Gold Creek as the legal boundary between most of the 
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lots in the 160-acre tract. Tr., p. 66, LL. 3-19; p. 69 L. 10 top. 70, L. 8. With regard to the 
location of the creek that served as the boundary to the Harvey and Read parcels, Mr. VanOoyen 
testified that: 
Q. All right. Sir, in that connection how many - in the area 
between what the Reads bought, parcel six, and let's say parcel 
ten which is across which Ms. Harvey owns; is that correct? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
Q. . . . was there more than one creek in that area? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it flowing in any other location other than - stiike that. 
Were you able to, when you worked on the property, see any 
indication that the creek was ever flowing any place other than 
where it was flowing at the time? 
A. No. We just saw one creek. 
Tr., p. 73, L. 25 to p. 74, L. 13 (emphasis added). Looking again at the marketing diagram 
drawn by Mr. VanOoyen and referenced in the testimony quoted above, it becomes clear that the 
area Mr. VanOoyen is being asked to describe is not in the tocation of Channels A, B, or C, 
which lie between the boundaries to Parcels 3, 11, and 12, but Channel D, which lies between the 
boundaries to Parcels 6 and 10. See Figure 1, p. 7, supra (Appendix C). 
Still testifying with regard to the location of the creelc boundary, Mr. VanOoyen 
testified that the water from Little Gold Creek flowed into the beaver ponds indicated on the 
marketing diagram, and then "flowed out" and "kept on going." Tr., p. 84, LL. 1-9. He then 
goes on to testify that: 
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A. . . . whenever we'd be showing these parcels up to the 
north, say, five, six, eight, so forth, in looking to the south you 
would see where we got the dotted lines here showing the open 
meadowy area that the creek definitely favored to the west, that 
open meadow area. . . And as I recall also way back in '72, that 
property that Boss bought [Parcels 10, 11 and 121 there were trees 
almost to the creek. In other words, the creek didn't run into the 
trees but stayed to the east of that treed area that was part of his 
property at that time. . . . 
Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you're saying on the west side 
of the creek there were some trees? 
A. Yes 
Q. On Frank Boss' property, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. And was the creek near those trees? 
A. Yes . . . Favored closer to those trees and left more meadow 
to the east of the creek than to the west. 
Q. [On cross examination] . . . Did you indicate that the trees 
that you were describing existed at the time that you made Exhibit 
Number 7 [Figure l]? Is that what you are describing? 
A. Yeah. As I recall when you looked down the meadow there 
were trees on the Boss property - 
Q. And do you recall what kind of trees they were? 
A. They were green. 
Q. Were they evergreen? 
A. The typical, yeah, uh-huh. 
Q. Any other kind of trees? Alder, hawthorn? 
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A. No. As I recall they were just evergreen trees. 
Tr.,p. 79, L. 5 top. 80, L. 15;p. 91, L. 3 top. 92,L. 4. 
Again, the content of Mr. VanOoyen's testimony regarding the location of the 
creek indicates that what Mr. VanOoyen is testifying to is the general location of Channel D. 
Essentially, what Mr. VanOoyen states is that in 1972, looking south from Parcels 6 and 8, it 
appeared that the creek flowed south out of the beaver ponds along the eastern edge of a bank of 
evergreen trees. A comparison of an aerial photograph taken in 1983 (Pls.' Ex. 16) 
(Appendix G) and an aerial photograph taken in 1996 showing an overlay of the currently 
disputed area identified by the Reads' expert witness, John Monks (Pls.' Ex. 19) (Appendix I), 
demonstrates quite plainly that in 1983, Channel D was banked by a heavy grove of trees to the 
west, but that there is no forestation anywhere near the purported location of what is now 
Channel c . ~  in short, while Mr. VanOoyen's testimony gives a clear indication as to the general 
vicinity of Channel D, his trial testimony is devoid any reference to Channel C at all. 
On direct examination regarding the description and location of the man-made 
drainage ditch originating out of Parcels 9 and 10, Mr. VanOoyen testified that: 
Q. Was there a difference in appearance between those two 
things, the creek and - what you understood to be the creek and the 
drainage ditch? 
A. Uh, as I recall the drainage ditch when I saw it was 
practically nothing in it at that time of year because it didn't flow 
all the time. 
This heavily treed area also appears on the 1997 Tucker Survey on the west side of 
Channel D. Pls.' Ex. 11 (Appendix D). 
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Q. Sir, could you describe the water flow in the creek that you 
drew on here? 
A. The water flow was good in Little Gold Creek. 
Q. . . . did the flow of water make any difference to you? 
A. Did the flow of water make any difference to me? 
Q. Right. 
A. Yes, it would have to be to the centerline of the creek. 
Q. All right. 
A. And to my knowledge there was only one creek. 
Tr., p. 78, LL. 4-19; p. 82, LL. 4-1 1. With regard to whether the northwestern drainage ditch 
eventually came to intersect with the creek at some point, Mr. VanOoyen testified that: 
Q. Okay. Sir, when you were doing the work back in 1972 
was there a drainage ditch up on the - let's say in parcel ten? 
A. Yes. 
A. . . . there was a drainage ditch running off that adjacent 
property onto this property. 
Q. So would that go through, let's say, parcel - looks like 
parcel nine into ten? 
Q. And did that drainage ditch dump into what you understood 
to be Little Gold Creek? 
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A. Yes. 
Tr., p. 76, L. 11 top. 77, L. 7. Notably absent from this testimony is any description of where 
the drainage ditch dumps into what the witness understood to be Little Gold Creek. The only 
testimony of record by Mr. VanOoyen on this issue is in Exhibit E to the Second VanOoyen 
Affidavit, where Mr. VanOoyen depicts the drainage ditch "dumping" into the creek at a point 
considerably east of the disputed property area: 
When asked whether Mr. VanOoyen had ever included the location of the 
drainage ditch on his 1972 marketing diagram, Mr. VanOoyen originally testified that yes, the 
ditch was indicated on that diagram by a dotted line. Tr., p. 77, LL. 20-25. He later recanted this 
testimony on cross-examination, testifying instead that the drainage ditch was in fact not 
depicted at all on the marketing diagram, and that the dotted line he had mistaken for the ditch 
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was actually one of two dotted lines indicating the general contours of the meadow. Tr., p. 87, 
At trial, Mr. VanOoyen never offered any specific testimony regarding the 
historical locations of Channel A, B, or C. Rather, what Mr. VanOoyen testified to was his 
general impression that, based on an inspection of the properties at the request of the Reads in 
1998, the water appeared to be flowing today "in the same location" in which it was flowing 
in 1972. Tr., p. 78, L. 20 top. 79, L. 6. Again, the district court relied heavily, if not 
exclusively, on this general statement in entering judgment in favor of the Reads. However, the 
competency of this testimony is gravely undermined by Mr. VanOoyen's further testimony 
regarding the extent and circumstances of his 1998 property inspection as orchestrated by the 
Reads: 
Q. And could you describe for me during that visit what was 
said to you by the Reads? 
A. Yeah. As I recall, there was some dispute over where the 
creek was, and, uh, they wanted to show me where the creek was 
so - and I agreed to go out there and physically go over it with 
them, which we did. 
Q. Okay. And so by your testimony are you - did they, the 
Reads, physically take you to where the creek was according to 
them? 
A. Uh, yes and no. Part of the time they took me to a few 
points, and it was tough to get through this canavy grass and 
what have you, and at several other places I walked it myself- 
Q. Um-hmm. 
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A. -- trying to follow the creek and then came back out to 
where they had cleared off trails to get even down closer in the 
canary grass. 
Q. Okay. You say the Reads cleared off trails for you to get -- 
A. Well, they made little - because the stuff was up over your 
head, and I'm talking about they brushed out a few little areas so 
that you could get to different points to see where the creek was. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then of course when you stood up high on higher 
ground and looked down you could see, you know, pretty well 
where the creek was. 
Tr., p. 89, L. 18 to p. 90, L. 19 (emphasis added). 
The difficulty of identifying and locating a small stream bed inside the meadowy 
area bounded by several channels was also later attested to by Robert Read, who described the 
canary grass that covers most of the meadow as: 
the most prolific grass in the world. It's actually a cane, and it 
grows about, uh, a foot a week so by June it can be over your head, 
by August it could be eight feet tall, so if you're down in it you 
can't see to go anywhere three feet in any direction, and if you're 
up top you couldn't even see a small moose walking by, so there's 
- it's good for farmers, hut for anybody that wants to use the land 
you can't just use your land unless you mow it all the time, and 
that ground is too wet to get down and mow it until it's about eight 
feet tall, so it's a real problem . . . . 
Tr., p. 277, L. 17 top. 278, L. 2. 
Based on this testimony, it is not possible for a reasonably objective fact-finder to 
determine what portions of the Little Gold Creek drainage basin Mr. VanOoyen inspected in 
1998 through use of the trails that had been brushed out by the Reads. Without adequate 
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foundation to establish exactly what Mr. VanOoyen viewed at the time of this inspection, it 
caimot be determined whether his inspection encompassed the entire area between Channels E, 
D, C, B, and A, or only some of those areas; and if only some, which ones. The lack of any such 
foundation is made even more important by the fact that at no other point in his testimony does 
Mr. VanOoyen reference, describe, or offer specific testimony regarding the existence or 
location of the channel marked on the 1997 Tucker Survey as Channel C. 
As such, the testimony of record of Mr. VanOoyen is not sufficient to support a 
finding that the boundary to the disputed property lies along Channels A and C or Channel B. 
Taken overall, Mr. VanOoyen's affidavit and trial testimony is both incoilsistent and self- 
contradictory. With regard to his trial testimony in particular, Mr. VanOoyen's testimony is at 
best inadequately vague and at worst, fails on its face to address the central factual issues of this 
case. To the extent that Mr. VanOoyen testified that he "couldn't see any difference" between 
the location of the creek in 1972 and the location of the creek in 1998, this testimony is simply 
not competent for the reasons that (I) Mr. VanOoyen never walked the boundary line between 
Parcel 3 and Parcels I I and 12 with Frank Boss prior to the time of sale; and (2) no foundation 
was ever laid showing that Mr. VanOoyen was properly oriented during his 1998 property 
inspection to offer testimony specifically related to the historical existence of any of these 
channels. 
Even assuming that Mr. VanOoyen was as "credible and convincing" a witness as 
the district court considered him to be, his testimoily is not the kind of evidence a reasonable trier 
of fact would accept and rely on ill determining whether a disputed fact had been proven. The 
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evidence offered by Mr. VanOoyen, however credible, failed to carry the Reads' burden of proof 
in establishing their claim to title based on the existence of Channel C in 1972. 
3. The Testimony Of Thomas Tauber Does Not Establish The Existence 
Of Channel C In 1972 Or That Channel A Carried Water From Little 
Gold Creek In 1972 
As with the testimony of Frank Boss, the district court found that "VanOoyen's 
testimony that the course in which Little Gold Creek flowed in the area in question had not 
changed since 1972, was corroborated by Tom Tauber, who testified that he was familiar with 
the area back in 1972, and who hayed in the area from 1975 to 1982." R., Val. 111, p. 547. A 
detailed analysis of that testimony demonstrates. this finding to be in error. 
At trial, Mr. Tauber testified that he "hayed the bottom ground" in the area of the 
Little Gold Creek drainage basin from 1975 to 1982. Tr., p. 101, L. 19 to p. 105, L. 18. 
Mr. Tauber was not haying this property in 1972, although "he knew Frank Boss" at that time. 
Id. The area in which Mr. Tauber primarily conducted his haying operation was to the west of 
the disputed property, on property owned by the Popplewells [Parcel 101. Id. He did not hay in 
the area immediately north of the Harvey residence (which is the location of the disputed area). 
Instead, he cut hay more to the west and south of the Harvey residence. Id. 
Mr. Tauber testified that in 1975, the drainage ditch that went from the 
Popplewells through the disputed property "was probably bigger than Little Gold Creek. Don 
Schull cleaned it out. That's actually one of the things that messed it up. He kind of messed it 
up digging it out and cleaning it out. It was a pretty wide ditch. We didn't cross it. We went 
into the field on [south and west side] of the drainage ditch . . . we couldn't cross the drainage 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ditch on [Harvey's] property." Tr., p. 110, L. 22 to p. 112, L. 7. Thus, Mr. Tauber testified that, 
after the property passed from Frank Boss to Don Schull in October 1974, Mr. Schull conducted 
extensive excavation in Channel A in the general area of the property in dispute. 
Mr. Tauber's trial testimony does not "corroborate VanOoyen's testimony that 
the course in which Little Gold Creek flowed in the area in question had not changed since 
1972." Mr. Tauber's actual trial testimony on that issue was this: 
Q. Okay. At the request of the Reads did you return to their 
property to take a look at the creek? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Were you able to observe the creek? 
A. Yes, where - 
Q. Can you tell the -what? 
A. Where it was usually, yeah. It's not a - it's a seasonal 
thing. Not all the years it's not always running. 
Q. All right. But, sir, can you tell the court where the creek 
was running compared to what you recall back in 1975 to '82? 
A. All the same. It hadn't changed. 
Tr., p. 107, LL. 6-18 (emphasis added). Not only was Mr. Tauber unable to testify regarding the 
general condition of Little Gold Creek any earlier than 1975 but, as with the testimony of Jerry 
VanOoyen, an inadequate foundation was laid for any particular testimony by Mr. Tauber as to 
the historical status of Channel C. Again, at no point in Mr. Tauber's testimony does he 
reference, describe, or offer specific testimony regarding the existence or location of the channel 
marked on the 1997 Tucker Survey as Channel C, either as of 1975 or the date of his later 
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property inspection at the behest of the Reads. As such, the testimony of record of Mr. Tauber 
does not constitute substantial and competent evidence of the existence of Channel C in 1972. 
4. The Testimony Of John Gillham Precluded A Finding That 
Channel C Existed In 1972 Or That Channel A Carried Water From 
Little Gold Creek In 1972 
John Gillham is the real estate agent that sold Harvey her property in Banner 
County. Tr., p. 415, L. 25 to p. 416, L. 19. He has also been a neighbor in that area since 1977. 
Tr., p. 414, LL. 20-24. Mr. Gillharn is personally familiar with the Read and Harvey properties, 
both as a real estate agent who has marketed and sold those properties, and as a result of having 
recreationally hiked and cross-country skied across the properties. Tr., p. 424, L. 18 to p. 426, 
L. 8. Based on his personal observation of the properties in 1977, Mr. Gillham testified that: 
Q. . . . So again, if you could describe for the Court where the 
water from the [Lower Beaver Pond] flowed down gradient? I 
think you said to the east? 
A. It would be on the east side of the pond, uh, and directly, - 
directly down - for clarification, towards the drainage creek. It did 
not go into the drainage creek at that time, but it flowed towards it. 
Q. Okay. So what direction would that be flowing downward? 
A. That would be south . . . Southeast actually, to get specific 
Q. And did you say that the creek from the beaver pond did 
not flow into the drainage channel? 
Q. No, it did not. 
Tr., p. 429,l. L. 22 top. 430, L. 13. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Q. Okay. Now, based upon this particular exhibit [Pls.' Ex. 
191 can you explain to the Court the location or the flow of Little 
Gold Creek as you recall it in the late 1980's? 
A. Um, Little Gold Creek would be the lightly - the light blue 
dotted line. 
Q. Okay, and- 
A. Which I believe that you have on the map as Ditch B. 
Tr., p. 437, L. 22 to p. 438, L. 4. 
Based on the foregoing, there can be no doubt that the existence of Channel C 
in 1972 cannot be established by the testimony of John Gillham. To the contrary, Mr. Gillham 
clearly and unequivocally testified that, at least as of the late 19807s, the water that flowed south 
out of Channel D, flowed into Channel B, and that there was no channel in existence that 
connected Channel D to Channel A other than Channel B. 
5. There Is No Competent Expert Testimony That Establishes The 
Existence Of Channel C In 1972 O r  That Channel A Carried Water 
From Little Gold Creek In 1972 
In support of their claim to title to the disputed area, the Reads engaged the 
services of professional hydrogeologist, John Monks. Tr., p. 113, L. 11 to p. 114, L. 14; p. 116, 
L. 3 to p. 117, L. 6 .  Although the district court does not appear to have relied one way or the 
other upon the expert testimony of Mr. Monks in reaching its decision to quiet title to the 
property in the Reads, a brief discussion of the expert testimony of Mr. Monks is nevertheless 
warranted under the relevant standard of review for this appeal. 
At trial, it was Mr. Monks' opinion that Little Gold Creek is flowing in the same 
place now as it was flowing in 1946, 1958, 1981, 1985, and 1996. Tr., p. 127, L. 17-19; p. 131, 
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LL. 17-20; p. 135, L. 21 top. 136, L. 5; p. 140, LL. 6-14; p. 137, L. 21 top. 138, L. 7. In 
reaching this opinion, Mr. Monks relied on several sources of information, including interviews 
with local farmers, the various Tucker surveys of the area, and a physical inspection of the 
properties in question; but the primary basis for Mr. Monks' opinion was his studied review of a 
series of aerial photographs dating from 1946 to 1996. Tr., p. 117, L. 7 top. 120, L. 21. 
Mr. Monks' professional training with regard to the interpretation of aerial photography is 
comprised of a three day course conducted by the National Ground Water Association that he 
attended in 1996 or 1997. Tr., p. 146, LL. 5-15. 
With regard to each of the photographs he reviewed, it was Mr. Monks' 
professional opinion that the location of Little Gold Creek could be determined "by the presence 
of a dark line that I interpret to be a drainage ditch;" Tr., p. 125, LL. 5-12; by "the dark color in 
the photograph indicating water or robust vegetation that is growing adjacent to the stream 
channel;" Tr., p. 130, LL. 17-22; "the presence of more robust vegetation that's growing adjacent 
to the channel" and the lack of indication that "there might be water in any other channel" other 
than Channel A; Tr., p. 135, L. 11 to p. 136, L. 5; by "relying on vegetation patterns, uh, 
showing there's a line of darker green vegetation that follows the course of Channel A through 
the photograph" but no indication "of water flowing . . . in any Channel other than A." 
Tr., p. 137, L. 21 top. 138, L. 7; p. 140, LL. 6-14," Although it was Mr. Monks opinion that 
'O Mr. Monks also notes that "Channel B is visible in [the 19581 aerial photograph," but 
this fact apparently does not alter Mr. Monks' professional opinion that the creek flow of Little 
Gold Creek has not changed in any respect since 1946. Tr., p. 132, LL. 1-5. 
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water has been flowing in Channel A, and only in Channel A, since 1972, he admitted at trial 
that it was not actually possible to determine where water was flowing on the ground based on 
any of the aerial photographs he reviewed. Tr., p. 163, L. 15 top. 165, L. 23. 
In response to the expert opinions offered by Mr. Monks at trial, Harvey called 
Captain Earl Hyde, a former aerial reconnaissance specialist with the Air National Guard. Tr., 
p. 563 L. 11 to p. 573, L. 24. Based on his review of the aerial photographs studied by 
Mr. Monks, Mr. Hyde testified that "[flrom these photos you can't determine or I can't 
determine in my professional opinion that any water is present in the photos." Tr., p. 579, 
LL. 3-5. The reasons given by Mr. Hyde for this opinion included the following: 
A. Well, basically, the area is vegetated. The water features 
that we're looking at or that we're trying to observe, uh, are 
probably somewhere in the neighborhood of two to three feet in 
width, and for photos of this resolution it's in my opinion 
impossible to determine whether or not water is present. 
A. . . . the photos were taken at too great of a distance to 
determine whether or not water was present anywhere in the 
photos in my opinion, and if you wanted to obtain a photo of the 
proper resolution to fulfill that objective, i.e., to determine whether 
there was water on the ground, the photos would have needed to be 
flown at a lower altitude. Photos of this nature aren't designed to 
do what we're asking them to do in this case. 
A. . . . you couldn't obtain the resolution out of them 
necessary to adequately determine whether there was water in, you 
know, in small ditches the sizes that these are. 
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Q. You are able from photographs, even with the pixilated 
problems attached to the report of Mr. Monks, able to see 
vegetation and other features that would be consistent with the 
presence of water, are you not? 
A. Well, I guess from the standpoint that it takes water to grow 
foliage, yes. l l  
Q. Okay. And you can see - strike that. Able to see channels? 
A. Um, I can't really determine whether they're channels. 
They're shadow lines on the ground. They could be game trails. 
They could be fence lines. Anything casts a shadow. 
Q. Okay. And that would then take someone going out on the 
ground and verifying what's visible from the air, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Tr., p. 579, LL. 7-12; p. 591, L. 18 top. 592, L. 2; p. 592, LL. 12-15; p. 592, L. 21 top. 593, 
L. 15. A similar opinion was expressed by another expert at trial, certified professional soil 
scientist, Pierre Bordenave, who testified that: 
I don't see the ability to see water in these photographs. An 
indicator of water, but there's indicators of water in other areas as 
well . . . I don't see any features in here that would indicate to me 
Channel C . . . I don't have a high-intensity lens to look at these, 
but even at that, um, it's -the Pack River looking at this on one of 
these, the Pack River itself is merely a pencil thin line, and in these 
areas Pack River is probably thirty or forty feet across. I do not 
think you're going to see any indication or any water in a stream 
the size of Little Gold Creek. 
I 1  It was the testimony of local resident and fanner, Thomas Tauber, that the vegetation 
in this area "comes and goes, you know, the alder and the junk stuff that comes up and goes 
away down there, little trees and, you know - different years when there's lots of snow it's 
different than when there's no snow . . . Every year it's different in North Idaho." Tr., p. 110, 
LL. 2-1 1. 
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Tr., p. 463, LL. 4-22; p. 496, L. 18 top. 497, L. 18. 
Ultimately, the expert testimony provided by Mr. Monks in support of the 
historical existence of Channel C as a "main tributary to the creek," does not provide substantial 
and credible evidence of the existence of that channel in the face of the direct and first-hand 
witness testimony of Frank Boss and John Gillham to the contrary. While Mr. Monks' opinions 
might otherwise be probative of this issue in the absence of any reliable eye-witness testimony, 
his opinions, without more, do not qualify as the kind of evidence upon which a reasonable trier 
of fact would accept and rely to establish the facts necessary to carry the Reads' burden of proof. 
At trial, the Reads bore the burden of affirmatively proving the existence of 
Channel C at the time that the Andersens sold Parcels 10, 11, and 12 to Frank Boss in 1972. 
They failed to carry this burden. A careful examination of this record reveals that the findings of 
the district court in support of its entry ofjudgment in favor of the Reads was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. The entry of that judgment therefore constitutes clear error 
and should be reversed by this Court on appeal. 
Moreover, where there is no evidence which would support further findings 
material to the judgment, the judgment must simply be reversed, the plaintiff having failed to 
prove his claim. Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225-226,646 P.2d 988,997 
(1982) ("However, our review of the record requires us to conclude that the evidence in support 
of these two elements is insufficient to prove a claim that Intermountain Gas was engaged in an 
attempt to monopolize, and therefore, while we reverse the judgment, we do not remand for 
further findings.") Because there is no substantial competent evidence to support a finding that 
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Channel C has been in existence since 1972, this case should be remanded to the district court 
with instructions to enter title to the disputed property in the location of Channel B. 
C. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That The Existence 
Of Water In Channel A In 1972 Constituted "The Law Of The Case" At 
Trial 
According to the Reads' theory of this case, it was the intention of Jerry 
VanOoyen, and therefore the intention of the parties to the 1972 Boss/Andersen deed, to "select 
the centerline of a channel in which water was actually flowing as opposed to a spot in dry 
ground" as the boundary for the properties. Tr., p. 33, L. 24 top. 37, L. 3. At trial, the Reads 
contended that the fact that "water was actually flowing" in Channel A in 1972 had been 
established by the district court as a matter of summary judgment; that this "finding" had been 
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal; and that this fact therefore constituted "the law of the 
case" and could not be challenged at trial: 
[Ylou as the trial court in 2002 made the decision that the water 
was flowing in Channel A in 1972. You also made the 
determination that the intent of the parties, and this was based on 
logic, that the intent of the parties to - the Andersens who created 
that common boundary line was that that the centerline of that 
channel be the common boundary line between the parties' 
properties. . . [Tlhe Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have 
affirmed your first finding. It's not dicta. It is clearly, 
unequivocally stated not only in its Statement of Facts but in the 
Supreme Court's identification of what issue is to be retried when 
it came back, and that is is it Channel A or is the natural 
comparatively dry historical creek channel? It made that 
determination and it affirmed the first one. The only thing the 
Supreme Court did say is there's a question of fact as to what the 
parties' intent was with respect to which channel. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Tr., p. 45, L. 15 to p. 46, L. 7. The district court agreed, and refused to consider any evidence at 
trial suggesting that water was not flowing in Channel A in 1972. Tr., p. 583, L. 18 to p. 584, 
L. 6 (". . . on the first day of trial I determined that that's the law of the case, that this Channel A 
consistently carried water. Help me understand the relevance of this witness's testimony."). 
The district court's refusal to consider any evidence in support of a finding that 
water was not flowing in 1972 in Channel A in the location of the property boundary being 
claimed by the Reads constitutes an error of law because the doctrine of "law of the case" 
encompasses only "principle(s) or rule(s) of law necessary to the decision." Spur Products Corp. 
v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 153 P.3d 1158 (2007). The doctrine does not encompass 
findings of fact.'' Rather, upon remand of this matter from this Court, the district court was 
required to hear and consider all evidence relevant to the question of the parties' intent. Such 
relevant evidence included the undisputed testimony of both Frank Boss and Jeny VanOoyen 
that Channel A did not carry a constant stream of water in 1972, and was therefore not the likely 
intended location of the creek boundary called out in the BossIAndersen deed. 
At trial, Mr. Boss testified that, in making the trip to his watering hole each day, 
he was required to cross over "a pretty tired ditch that didn't work very well . . . an ill-maintained 
'' A legal proposition of which the district court was clearly aware at the time. See 
Robideawc v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3304476 (Idaho Dist. 
October 2006) (Mitchell, J.) ("The "law of the case" doctrine is applied to legal "principles" and 
"rules of law," and not findings offact made by the appellate court."). The district court's 
decision in Robideaux v. Idaho Dept. of Lands was issued one month after entry of the interim 
judgment in this matter. 
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ditch that drained the field above." Tr., p. 646, L. 19 top. 647, L. 4. Mr. Boss went on to testify 
regarding this ditch as follows: 
Q. [On cross examination] . . . Sir, you mentioned a ditch. Is 
the ditch depicted on Exhibit QQQQQ . . . 
Q. There's a ditch that's referred to up here. 
A. Well, if that's the low spot of the field, then I would say 
that's the ditch, the historic ditch that had been there for drainage 
purposes, farming purposes. 
Q. And when you say it had been ill-maintained, what was the 
-what do you mean by that? 
A. Well, it hadn't been dug out or, uh, shot with dynamite for 
some time. 
Q. And the effect of being ill-maintained was what? 
A. Well, I found out that I bought about fifty or sixty acres of 
a mosquito farm flooded with water, and uh, it didn't go away until 
June and couldn't get in there with equipment to fann until late in 
the year, and then you were just cutting canary grass. 
Q. Okay. And that ditch, did it - did you do anything to try to 
improve the flow? 
A. Right. When they were out there with a backhoe for my 
purpose of getting a little bit of a - something dug there for water, 
uh, we attempted to improve the ditch, but we discovered of course 
that, you know, unless you dug further downstream, too, all you 
did was give a place for the water to sit. 
Q. And sir, did it -when you did your improvement to the 
ditch did you tie it into the creek or clear it in that area? 
A. No. 
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Q. You just dug, what someplace up further? 
A. Yeah. We dug up along further up the ditch line. 
Q. Okay. And that had no effect? 
A. Right. 
Tr., p. 650, L. 25 top. 653, L. 14. 
This testimony is competent to establish the fact that water was not "flowing" in 
1972 in the "ill-maintained drainage ditch" that existed in the location of Channel A. To find 
otherwise would require the fact-finder to conclude that, in obtaining the water he needed every 
day for his personal household use, Mr. Boss carried a bucket from his cabin on the southern 
edge of the meadow, across Channel A (which was full of flowing creek water), then across 
Channel C (which was also full of flowing creek water), and retrieved his water from a hole he 
chose to dig for some utterly inexplicable reason in a location to the north of the intersection 
between Channels D and C. And yet, this is precisely the finding that was made by the district 
court based on Mr. Boss' testimony. In an exercise of what can only be described as willfully 
obtuse reasoning, the district court found that: 
VanOoyen's testimony was corroborated by Harvey's own 
witness, Frank Boss. In 1972, Boss bought the parcel Harvey now 
owns, plus some additional land which totaled 75 acres. Boss 
testified he sold the land in 1974, in part because he was tired of 
walking down to the creek to get his water. While living there in 
1972-74, Boss dug a deep hole with a backhoe, adjacent to the 
creek, on what he considered his land on his side of the creek, from 
which to fetch his water to haul back to his cabin. Boss marked 
the location of the hole he dug on Exhibit QQQQQ. The mark on 
the map was adjacent to where Little Gold Creek currently flows, 
in Channel C. 
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R., Val. 111, p. 547. 
Similarly, the district court erroneously refused to consider Mr. VanOoyen's 
testimony that the drainage ditch that entered the property from the northwest had "practically 
nothing in it at that time of year because it didn't flow all the time," as compared to Little Gold 
Creek, where "water flow was good." Tr., p. 78, LL. 4-19; p. 82, LL. 4-1 1. The district court's 
erroneous application of the doctrine of the "law of the case" and its refusal to consider all 
relevant evidence regarding the flow of water in Channel A in 1972 as it relates to the intended 
boundary to these properties warrants reversal of the district court's judgment in this case 
Moreover, because the unchallenged evidence of record demonstrates that water 
was not "flowing" in Channel A in 1972, the Reads have failed to prove the elements necessary 
to support their claim for title as a matter of law. This matter should therefore be remanded to 
the district court with instructions to enter title to the disputed property in the location of 
Channel B 
D. The District Court Erred In Ordering Harvey To Provide And Pay For A 
Survey Of Little Gold Creek As Part Of Its Judgment In Favor Of The 
Reads 
In its September 1,2006 Memorandum, the district court concluded that in order 
to comply with Idaho law, Little Gold Creek must be surveyed over the course it serves as the 
common boundary between the Read Property and the Harvey Property. R., Val. III., p. 555. 
The necessity for such a survey was due to the fact that the 1997 Record of Survey 
commissioned by the Reads and conducted by Tucker Engineering was admittedly legally 
inadequate to establish the boundary of Little Gold Creek as of 1997. As part of its Interim 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Judgment, the district court sua sponte ordered Harvey to provide and pay for a survey that 
would correct the deficiencies in the Reads' 1997 Record of Survey "in the exercise of its 
equitable powers," without citing any authority or justification for allocating the cost of that 
survey to Harvey. R., Vol. III., p. 555. 
Entry of this order constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion for the 
reason that the cost of such survey was necessitated by the Reads' initiation of an action to quiet 
title, and not by any defense undertaken by Harvey during the course of that action. Even if 
Harvey had elected not to defend against the Reads' action and had allowed a default judgment 
to be taken against her, the Reads would have had the responsibility of recording of a lawful 
survey as part of their claim to title. The cost of the survey is therefore equitably placed upon the 
Reads, not Harvey, and the district court's judgment regarding the payment of those costs by 
Harvey should be reversed. 
E. The District Court Erred In Awarding Reads Their Attorneys' Pees from 
October 3,2005, Through Trial Pursuant To Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(c) 
In its September 1,2006 Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the district court invited the Reads to seek an award of attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 by entering a finding that "after no later than February 7, 
2002, the date Jerry VanOoyen's affidavit was filed, Harvey's defense of this lawsuit and 
prosecution of her counterclailn has been frivolous." R., Vol. III., p. 555,T 11. See Balderson v. 
Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 54,896 P.2d 956,962 (1995) ("An award of attorney fees may be 
granted under I.C. 5 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party and such an award is 
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appropriate when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."). The Reads accepted this invitation 
by the district court and filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 on September 8,2006. R., Vol. 111, p. 557. 
Harvey opposed the Reads' motion for fees on the grounds that the finding was 
contrary to the prior rulings of this Court and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award 
attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 during the pendency of Harvey's appeal. R., 
Vol. IV, p. 661-681. In a Memorandum Decision and Order dated December 19,2006, the trial 
court begrudgingly conceded that it could not, as a matter of law, find that Harvey's defense of 
this action had been frivolous throughout the entire period of time that she sought appellate 
review of the trial court's entry of summary judgment. R., Vol. IV, p. 788-791. However, 
having determined that it was legally precluded from awarding the Reads attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121, the district court went on to determine that it would 
nevertheless award the Reads their attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(c) on the grounds that, shortly upon remand of this matter to the district court for 
trial, Harvey failed to admit nearly every request for admission that had been served on her. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) provides that: 
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the 
truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party 
requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply 
to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the 
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
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I.R.C.P. 37(c). A trial court 
shall make the order unless it finds that 1) the request was held 
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or 2) the admission sought 
was of no substantial importance, or 3) the party failing to admit 
had reasonable grounds to believe that the party might prevail on 
the matter, or 4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
I.R.C.P. 37(c); Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 753, 86 P.3d 458,467 (2004). The trial court 
must link its analysis of attorney fees to one of the exceptions of Rule 37(c). Id. A trial court's 
decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, which is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Perkins v. US.  Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427,429,974 P.2d 73 (1999) 
In this case, the district court found that "from October 3, 2005, through trial, 
Harvey had 'no reasonable ground that she might prevail on the matter' at trial." R., Val. IV, 
p. 793. In particular, the district court found that: 
The ''issue[sl" as framed by most all of the Requests for 
Admission, are that the water flowed in Channel "A" at all times 
pertinent to this litigation (since 1972 and ever since that time), 
and that in 1972 when the property was subdivided by Andersens it 
was their intent that the boundaries run to this Channel A where 
the creek was running. Harvey argues she was reasonable in her 
denial because "the Supreme Court clearly found that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the boundary should be 
the now-relatively dry natural stream channel, or Channel A," Id., 
p. 14. Harvey completely ignores that whether the Supreme Court 
found there to be an issue of material fact regarding some 
historical dry stream channel has nothing to do with what she was 
being asked to admit, i.e., that in 1972 water flowed in 
Channel "A," only in Channel "A" and that Chailllel "A" is what 
the Andersens intended to be the boundary when they subdivided 
in 1972. Harvey's remaining reasons why her denials were based 
upon "a reasoilable belief in prevailing upon tile issue" likewise 
ignore the "issue" sought to be admitted. Harvey claims she had 
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evidence of Reads' dredging in the 1990's, that Read altered the 
flow of the channel and that some of the other deeds referenced 
"drainage ditch" and "creek." None of those has a thing to do with 
what Harvey was being asked to admit, and that was the fact that in 
1972 water flowed in Channel "A," only in Channel "A" and that 
Channel "A" is what the Andersens intended to be the boundary 
when they subdivided in 1972. 
R., Vol. IV, p. 796. 
Thus, despite this Court's determination that Harvey was entitled to present 
evidence of the intent of the parties to the BossIAndersen deed, based on the testimony of Jerry 
VanOoyen, Frank Boss, Jell Gillham, Richard Tucker, and a host of expert witnesses that water 
was flowing other than in Channel A in 1972 and that it therefore could have been the intent of 
Frank Boss and Dick Andersen to place the property boundary in a location other than 
Charnel C and A, the district court deemed it unreasonable for Harvey to insist on exercising 
her right to that trial by refusing to admit (within 6 months of this Court's reversal of the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment) all of the facts necessary to establish the Reads' claim to 
title. Such a decision constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. 
"It would cause a chilling effect on the parties to answer requests for admission in 
good faith, believing they had a legitimate argument over liability, only to have significant 
attorney fees assessed later as sanctions if they guessed wrong, even slightly." Bailey v. Sanford, 
139 Idaho 744,753,86 P.3d 458,467 (2004). Because Harvey had reasonable grounds to 
believe, based on all available evidence and not just the February 5,2002 affidavit of Jerry 
VanOoyen, that she might prevail on each of the issues addressed in the Reads' requests for 
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admission, the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the Reads pursuant lo Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c). 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court improperly focused almost exclusively upon the testimony of 
Jerry VanOoyen to establish the "intentions of the parties to the conveyance inslruments." 
Instead of objectively evaluating the testimony of the grantee, Frank Boss, the district court 
relied alinost entirely upon the testimony of the grantors' (Andersens) agent. This occurred 
despite the agent's confessed lack of participation in the 1972 conveyance transaction and failure 
to physically inspect the creek boundary line at that significant point in time. This mistaken 
approach constitutes reversible error. 
Additionally, but for the proven existence of Channel C in 1972 as the "creek" 
called out in the Boss deed, the Reads have no legal or factual basis for claiming title to the land 
located between Channels A and B. Because there is no substantial and competent evidence of 
record to support such a finding, the Reads' claim to title must fail. Moreover, because there is 
no evidence which would support further findings material to the judgment, this matter should he 
remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment establishing the boundary 
between the two properties in the location of what is currently known as Channel B. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
DATED this I & day of February, 2008. 
Attorneys for-~ennifer Harvey 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEWBY CERTIFY that on this *day of February, 2008, I caused a tme 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served by the  neth hod indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. f l  US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
DEAN & KOLTS ( ) Hand Delivered 
1 1 10 West Park Place, Suite 212 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 ( ) Facsimile 
Fax: 208.664.9844 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPENDIX A 
to 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court Case No. 34336 
presently flows between Reads' property and Harvey's property. That was the same channel in 
which water flowed in 1972. 
8. Plaintiffs Robert and Alexis Read are entitled to judgment against defendant 
Jennifer Harvey, quieting title to the property on their side of Little Gold Creek as it currently 
flows. This is the same location as Little Gold Creek flowed in 1972. 
9. To comply with Idaho law, Little Gold Creek must be surveyed over the course it 
serves as the common boundary between the Read Property and the Harvey Property, such 
distance extending the northerly pin placed near the creek by Tucker Engineering in its 1977 
survey for Don Schull (Trial Exhibit 9) and the southerly pin set near the creek by Tucker 
Engineering in its 1997 survey (Trial Exhibit 10). 
10. In the exercise of its equitable powers, the Court concludes that defendant Harvey 
should bear the wst  of such survey and directs that the same be completed within 60 days of the 
date hereof. Upon completion, the survey must be presented to counsel for the plaintiffs Reads 
for review and approval. The legal description of the course of Little Gold Creek, when 
approved by the Court, shall be included its final judgment. 
I I. The plaintiffs are deemed to be the prevailing parties for purposes of IRCP 54(d). 
Furthermore, after no later than February 7,2002, the date Jerry VanOoyen's affidavit was filed, 
Harvey's defense of this lawsuit and prosecution of her counterclaim has been frivolous, because 
as of that date Harvey has known of the original landowner's (Andersens') intent as stated by 
Andersens' agent Jerry VanOoyen, and Harvey has never obtained any evidence to the contrary 
of the original landowner's (Andersens') intent. 
DATED this eday of September, 2006. 
- 
+-,- h - 
,,.4%n 4 Mitchell, District Court Judge 
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AT 6 : (t 7 O'CIOCK AM 
CLERK, DlSTRlCT COURT 
n\r THE DIS1'KICT COURT QF THE FIRST JUDICIAT, DISTNCT 
OF THE S'I'ATE OF IDAHO, COUNXY OF BONNER 
ROBL!Kf C. READ and ALEXIS M. READ, ) 
husband and wife, )Case No.: CV-99-00830 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) MEMORANDUM DECSLON AND ORDER 
) ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
vs f RECONSIDERATION MI) MOTION TO 
) AMEM) INTERIM JUDGMJDT AND 
JENNl1:EK 'HRVEY, an unn~nwied woman. ) PLAMTIFFS' MOTION FOR ORDER 
) AWARDR\TG FEES AND COSTS 
Defendant 1 
A bench trial was held August 21-23,2006 On September 1,2006, this couri eniered its 
fvIcmorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of l aw.  Pertinent to the present 
tnotion for attorney's fees this court Ibund [hat sincc Defendant I I w e y  knew of thc original 
landowner's intent as to the property lines, and thcrcfore had no legal or factual basis to oppose 
the relieisoi~ght by thc Plaintiffs Rends, Hawey's clefensc of the lawsuit and prosecution of her 
counte~claim was frivolot~s. Thc Court held Reads were the prevailing party for purposes of 
I R C P S4(d) Ileads filed their motion for anorney fees and costs they incurrcd in prosecutitrg 
the case and defending Harvey's counterclsim, rtrguing Harvcy knew ail along illat thc ccnterline 
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ol*thc current channel oCLittlc Gold Creek was the location of 11er common boundary with the 
Kcads 
At the September 25,2006, oral argument on Reads' Motion for Costs and Attorney Fccs 
and Harvcy's Motion for Reconsidcration and Motion to Amend Interim Judgmmt, R e d s  
argued Harvcy purposefully deceived the Supreme Court and thc Court of Appeals Reads 
argued that since IIarvey h e w  there was no factual dispute as to thc common boundary of their 
propenies, hcr defense and counterclaim was frivolous and the Reads should be awarded their 
costs and attorney fees. Harvey argued shc should not have to pay costs and atiorncy fees, 
cspecialty those asgcociatcd with the appcal process bccause balh appellate courts found therc W 
a genuine issue of material fact (hat prcciuded summary judgment and therefore her claim was 
not frivolous. 
A h  heitring on the motions, the Court ordered the parties to submit a copy of the record 
on appcal so the Court would know what informafion was beforc the appellatccourts and 
ordered supplementai bricfing so the Court could detcrmine if Harvcy had a factual basis fbr 
pursi~iiig hcr claim when she appealed this Coun's suunmary judgrnmt dismissal That material 
was reccivcd and revicwed by the Court. All motions are now at issue. 
11. hlO'i'ION TO KEC'ONSZDER. 
A. Timfiness. 
Reads argue Harvey's Motion to Reconsider is uniimcly. -The Memorandum Decision. 
Findings of Fact and Collcluriions of Law was filed September 1,2006. Harvey's Motion for 
Reconsideration was filed September 13,2006, and wa ntade pursuant to 1.K.C P. I 1 (a)(2)(B) 
Said rule requires a motion for reconsideration to be made not later than fourteen days after the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Pugc 2 
entry of the final judgmcnt Even ifthc Memorai~dun~ Lkcision, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law werc a Judgment (~vhich it is  no^), Huvcy's Motion for Kcconsideration is 
timely 
B. Frotn a Factual Stsndpoint, Harvey's Motion to Reconsider Must bc Denied. 
Harvey asks this Coun to reconsider and amend "tlat part of its Meinorandurn Decision: 
Findings of Fact, and Conclusioi~s of Law ('Memorandum Decision') [indins that 'after no latcr 
than February 7,2002, the dale Jcrry VmOoyctll's affidavit was filed, Harvey's defense of this 
lawsuit and prosecution of'her counterciain1 has been frivolous, becausc as of that dale Harvey 
has know [sic] of thc otiginal iandowncr's (Ander$ons').[sic] intent as staled by Andersons' 
agent Jerry VanOoycn, and I.I;lrveyhas ncvcr. obtained any evidcnce to the contrary of the 
original Iandotvner's (Andersons') [sic] intcnt. Memorandum decision, p. 15 " I)erendmt3s 
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-2 
From a factualstandpoin~, [he Motion for Reconsideration must be denied. As soon as 
Harvey w u  involved in this lawsuit, she injected her own ambiguity into tlie deed. That 
ambiguity did not +ly exist. Harvey first defended this lawsuit claiming, "l'hcre is a disl~ule 
hetwccn READ and HARVEY regadi~tg the natural and historical location of 'the main tributary 
of  Little Gold Creek' and, hcncc, READ and HARVEY have a dispute relating to the c o n ~ l ~ ~ o n  
b0~11dary iinc of the EIARVFY PROPERTY zmd tl~r eal property owned by READ." Answer 
and C;ounttrclaim, p 4. Reads liled a Motion for Slu~~rnary Judgmcnt on February 7,2002, and 
suppartcd that motion with an Affidavit of Jerry VanOoyen filed that sane dale. VanOoyen's 
affidavit detailed how he was retained by Dick D. Anderw and Nancy L. Andersm, [he orvners 
of all this land, to subdivide and market the Andersens' property, and how he uscd "the 
ccnterline ofthe main channel of T,ittle Gold Creek which traversed thc property as a boundary "? 
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Affiddvit of Jerry VanOoyen, p p  1-2.112-4. VanOoyen also stated unequivocally that the main 
channcl of Little Gold Creek is in the same location in 1998 as it was in 1972 whcnhe 
subdivided the Andersens' property. 16 , p. 2, 'lj 6 VanOoyen stated that the main channel of 
Little Gold Crcck was intended to be the bounduy hetween what are now the Read and H&ey 
properties arid is depicted as channel "A" on the Tucker Engineering Survey, and that he is 
"positive that 1,ittlc Gold Creek did not flow through the ditch labeled aq '13' on the Tucker 
Engineering survey at any time rclcvant to this proceeding." Id, p 2 ,17 .  Harvey filed an 
arfidavit on February 28, 2002, and while she statcd that she has "had an ongoing cioubf that 
Cllannel 'R' is thc actual property fine sePr&ing the ihrvey and Read properties due to the fact 
. . 
that it is a small gully thal does not resenlhle anytype of natural creek" (Affidavit of Jennifer 
Harvey, 17. 2,1[ 4), nowhere in that affidavit does she identify any evidence to contradict 
VinOoyen's testimony of the grantors' intent back in I972 "Ongoing doubt" is not enough to 
defend this lawsuit or support her counterclaim wllen confronted with the unconlndicted 
testimony of Jcrry VanOoyen, the person who subdivided thc properly as the agent of the 
original &antors, the Andersens Halvry alsofilcd the alTi&vit of soil scientist Pierre 
Bordenave, who opined that thc "historic c e n t d i e  of 'Titlle Ciold Creek' is well to the cast of 
d l  the excavated channels"' (Affidavit oTBordenave, p. 4,714). but Bordcnave rendered no 
opinion as to tvherr Littlc Gold Creek flowed in 1972 Again, Rordcnave providcs no evidencc 
contrary to the lestimony of the pcrson who subdivided the property as the agcnt of the original 
grantors, the Aadcrsens. Harcrcy argued at summw judgmcnt that s i ~ ~ c e  Little Gold Crcek 
sccrned to flow present day in a "drainage ditch" and since thc deeds do not mention a boundary 
line being delincated as a drainage ditch, then "Presumiihly, the term 'creek' as used in thc deeds 
refers LO a naturnl drainrgc and not a nlan made drainage." Urief it1 Oppositioll lo thc Plaintill's 
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Motion filr Sumnlary Judgment, p 3, citing I C $42-J502(e). Harvey, through creafire 
lat%yering, and not ttuough faas, injrcied ambiguity into a situation where ambiguity did not 
exist. Jiarvey's argumml is a statue indicatcs a "creek" has to be a "natural drainage". and sincc 
shc had evidence that the creck flowed in an area thal may be a drainagc ditch, her boundary 
should be [lie historical s t~ambed.  Injecting that anbiguity has been Harvey's only defense 
' h i t  injectcd ambiguily fails for several reasons. First. that statutc is part ofthc "Minimum 
Streat11 Flow" legislation passed in 1978. That legislation was passed in an attempt io lcccp other 
states from taking Idaho's xvrttcr. .She statute docs not have a thing to do with boundary disputes. 
Seccmd, that statute itsclf does nctf say what Harvey wants ii to say. Idaho Cbdc $42-IS02(3) 
raids: "'Stream' nleans any lake, spring, creek, stream, river or othcr natural body of standing or 
movi~~g water which is subject to appropriation under the laws of the State of idalto." A clear 
reading of that subsection of that statute is: "strean1 means creek". A clcar reading of that statute 
i s  NOT as 1,iarvey would have w all belicver "meek mcans natural 'body of moving water " 
Third. even if that statute said what Harvey wanls it to say, her argument would elevate fonil 
ovcr snbstance. since the ONLY proof in this casc as to what thc original grantors. the 
Andersens, intended. was through Va~iOoycn, the person who subdivided the property. While 
VanOoyen may have i~ot  known of my IegaI distinction betwccn a creek and a drainage ditch, he 
was cem'n [hat thc oniy body of moving water in the area, tvhich hc took to in fact be Little 
Gold Creek, had ncvcr changed counc since 1972, and was the common boundary &tween 
Kcads' land and kiarvey'~ land in other words, Harvey manufactured her defense of this lawsuit 
through a at~xined in(erprctation of I C. Ej 12-1502(e), asking the Court to have that strained 
interpretation aump the unconfrovcrted testilnony of the man who subdivided thc property This 
Court tvas ut~willing to do so, and granted summary judgmcnt in favor of the Reads Harvcy 
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appealed The Courl of Appeals affiniled the decision of this Court. A petition for revie~v was 
thcn filed. In Ht~~~*cy ' s  Brief in Support of Petition for Review, Harvcy abandoned hcr argumml 
under 1.C $42-1502(e), and substituted Meniam .Websterqs Collegiate Dictionary, 10Ib ed 
(1995) whcrc "creek" is defincd as "a natriral stream of water. .." Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review, p 8 The Idaho Suprcme Court then rcvcrsed the district court and the Court of 
Appeals, finding there wa.. a material issue of Cact, writing: 
The intentions of the partics to the conveyance instruments in question are 
conscqucntly unclear and must be detem~ined as questions ol'ract with reference 
lo thc surrounding racts and circumstances. 
Rcudv. FIwve~ 141 Idaho 497,500,112 P 3d 785,788 (2005). The Suprcmc Court then notcd 
the paitics disagree as LO whar "the drafters ol.1he original deeds intendcd to invoke" when 
referring to "the creek" in thc deeds, either "channel A, a drdinage ditch which has  consistcnflp 
during the times in qucstion carried water, or the comparatively dry historical natural crcek 
channel is a queslion offact that precludes summary judgment." Id 'She Supre111e Court made 
rekrcnce to VimOoyen's affidavit 141 ldaho at 498-99.112 P.3d at 786-87 Since thar alrrdavit 
slatcd cxactly what "die drafrcrs of the oiigiital deeds intended to invoke'; this COUH can only 
&s.mrnc that the Idaho Suprcmc COW sit~lply Jailed to keep in mind the uncontroverted evidence 
&& 
of ~an0oye11; tthe-oniy cvidence of the drafters' intent. 
The Ida110 Supreme Couli in [he first instance apparently did not discern that Harvcf used 
Merrian~ Wcbster to inject ambiguity to this deed. 111 the sccond instance the Idaho Supreme 
Court, in analyzing [his dwd made ambiguous only by Mmiarn Webster, did not appear Lo 
appreciate that the only and unconaadjcted intent of the gmtor, was ihrough VanOoyen Tile 
Inal court (ond appellate courts) should consider "extrinsic evidence of the circumstances and 
inccntions of the original parties" to the inslrument Lothan? v Garner, 105 Idaho 854,858, 673 
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P ?d 1048, 1052 (1983): I\'i?!.SOfl v Jo11nron 106 ldaho 385.3S7.679 P.2d 662,664 (1984) The 
only evidcnce of the grantors' intent was through thc grantors' agcnt Jerry VanOoyen 
This Cour~ has previously set forth its analysis in the inlerprctntion of thc pertinen( dccds 
3.  his Cour? must interpel ihc dceds gimting the Reads thcir parcels, and granting 
Harvey her pmccl. The T&o Supreme Court has previously noted, on an carlier appeal 
of this matter, that if deeds are ambiguous, [heir interprelation i s  a question of fact. Read 
11. flon?c.y, 141 Idaho 497, 112 P.3d 785 (2005)' The Idaho Suprema Court has also 
found that thc Kead and Harvey deeds areambiguous. Id: 
4. When interpreting dccds, cow seek to ascertain thc drafter's intcnt. Id In .this case, 
the task of the Courl is to detennine what the Anderscns meant whcn they used the ten11 
"the centcrline olthe crcek." 
5. In making that determination, the Court must consider the deeds as a whole. and rot 
select ccitain par& of thc deeds. Moreover, the deeds should be construed so  that all 
tenns in thc deed are givcn effect Thompson on Reuf Proporfy, David A. Thomas, 
Editor-in-Chief (2nd Thomas Ed. 1999), $82.13&)(2), p. 668 (footnotes omitted). 
6. This Court is not pwuadcd by I I amys .xgment s  regarding Anderscns' distinctions 
between "crcck" and "drainage" ditch. as it asks the Court to cngage in wvholcsale 
assumplion as to Ande~sas '  knowfed~e ofrhe ground in question, md aqks the Courl lo 
ignore the uncontroverled testimony of Jery VanOoyen as to Andersens' intcnt. and 
would result in Andersens having subdivided thcirland baed upon a meandering line lo 
a dry creek bcd, not clearly visible on rhc ground at the time, lcaving sevml parcels 
bisected by the a r t d  flowing creek and leaving several parccls without acccss to the 
water in thc actual fl owving crcek 
7. The Andersens, wllo in 1072, created thc legal descriptions at issue in this cue, 
intendcd the common b o u n d q  at issue to be the cenlerline of the chamcf in which water 
presently flows bolwccn Keads' property and Ibrvey's property. That uras the samc 
channel in which watcr flo~veved in 1972 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclu<ions of Law, pp. 14-15 Nothing in that 
analysis changes on recokidcration. The Court has reviewed thc briefing to thc Idaho Court of 
Appeals and thc ldaho Supreme Court While this Cou~t  finds no purposeful deception by 
I-faxfey LO ti~c Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, 1-Iarvey certainly continued hcr baseless 
argumcnt that the Andcrscns must have Incant to subdivide these parcels along a historically dry 
riverbed. Harvey's argunimt is baseless in light of VanOoyen's affidavit The Idaho Court of 
Appeals did not buy into this baseless argument. For some reason the Idaho Suprenlc Coourt %(as 
apparently confused by the argunlent. The question then is:  "Can the Idaho Suprenle Court 
decision cause lherc to be no frivolousdeSensc of this lawsuit as a mattcr of la\v?" 
C. From a Legxi Standpoint, H;trvey's Motic~n to Reconsider Must he Grantcd. 
Thc district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary dccision, suqjcct to 
tile abuse of discretictn standard of review Bnilcy v Sanford, 1-59 Idaho 744,753,86 P.3d 458, 
367 (2004). Idaho Code 12-121 pennits a trial coun to award riasonable attorneys' fees to Ihe 
prcvailingpat.(y in any civil litigation. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c)(I) IinliL~ thc uin1 
court's au~hority to cnses in which the Courf finds "frbm the facts presented to it. that thc case 
was brought, pursued or derendcd frivolously, unreasonrthly or without ibundatiori." The 
dccision lo award fees when any of those factors are prescnt is comrnittcd to the sound discretion 
of the trial court ond subject to review on an abuse of discretion standard. Soriu v Sicrru 
P~c{fific Airlines, 1 I 1 Idaho 594, 615,726 P.2d 706,723 (1986). 
l'hc frivolity and unreaso~labIencss pf a del'ensc is not to he examined only in the conlest 
of eial proceedings. The cntire course of the litigation should be taken into account. Turner r 
g l r i s ,  I I6 Idaho 682,685, 778 P 2d 804 ( I  Y89). Under 1.K.C P 54(e)(l) the Coi~rl has 
discrelion to award attorney fccs when i t  linds, from the facts presented to it, that the casc was 
brought, pursued or defended friaolousiy Howvever, thc total defense of a party's proceedings 
must bc u~~reasonablc or frivolous Magic Valley Radiology A.ssociates v Prcijhsionnl Business 
Services inc, 119 fdnho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (1991) (ai~phasis added) Tllc prevailing party is 
not enlitlcd to attorney fccs where the Coua finds there is a legitimate, triable issue, and where 
llzc "total defe~ise"of the case is ttot unreasor~able or frivolous. Turner v iviflis, 1 19 Idaho 1023, 
1025. 812P 26737(i991). 
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In Turner; thc Supreme Court held the Defendant was not liable for the Plaintiffs' 
attorney fees even though it did not drop a groundless defense until thc beginning ortrial The 
Court held that attomcy fees were not propcr because, although the trial proccedings involvcd 
only the issue ol'damagcs, that issue war a icgitimate, triablc issue. Ida1 1025. 'Che Cotlrt 
statcd that the antirc course of the litigation should he taken into accounl and thcrcfore attolney 
fces were not warranted because thc "total defense of [the] case was not unreasonable or 
frivolous." Id. 
Rcads claini they arc entitled to auorneys' fees under the rules stated above bccause 
Ijarvey's claims and prosecution of her counterclaim went beyond frivolous to the point of being 
millicious. Kcads argue Harvey "concocted arguments, manipulil~ed and mi~re~rese~rted the 
opinions of hcr cxperts, and advocatcd a position she had to know was Lhoroughly iliogical at 
best and diroctfy contradicted" by witness testimony. Supplemental Mmmo, p. 2. Kcads argue 
Flrlrvey's appcal was also frivolous because, as was discovered at ma], Harvey kncw the 
argunlcnts presented lo the Idaho Supreme Cowl rnisrcpresented the inl'orn~ation found within 
the affidavits. 
Iiavvey argues she had reasonable grounds for believing shc might prevail at trial and on 
appeal, and thercforc her claims were not frivolous. Harvey points to the fact that the Supreme 
Coutt found there was a genuine issue of matcrial fact when i t  remanded thc case to the lower 
courts, which providcd hcr with iegal support for her position.. Harvey assMs that this Court 
cannot apply a "retrospective lens lo determinewhat Ms. Harvey kncw during the appellate 
proccedings in this case." Defendant's Final Bricf, p. 2. IIwvey claims that bccause discovery 
had not occurred until al'ter thc conclusion of (he appcllate proceedings, the information she 
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actluircd through discovery was not available to her prior to hcr appeal, making Reads' claims of 
l>i\~olitp unsupported accusations 
Neithcr the Reads nor this Court can deny that i-Iarvey convinced the Idaho Supreme 
Coutt to overtun1 [his Court's decision on summary judgment .. While the Rcads and this Courl 
may not undersla~id that decision givcn VanOoyen's uncontradicted 'dffidavit, by operation of 
law the ldaho Supreine Court's decision causes Harvcy's defense to not be liivolous. Under 
1,Ili~gv ~mrr/gaolatc?ct~~u~ar, 105 Idaho 905; 684 ~ . 2 d ; 0 7  (CtAw. 1984) and Turner v 
IVillis 116 Idaho GS2,778 P.2d 804 (1989), attorney fees under Idaho Codc $ 12-1 21 would be 
improper through and including the remititor of this action back to the district court 
Conclusion oi' Law 11 reaLs. 
I I .  Thc p1sintifKs are dccmed to be thc prevailing parties for purposes of 
IKCP 54(d). Furthemiore, aftcr no later than February 7,2002, the dale Jcrry 
VanOoycm's affidavit was filcd. IIarvey's dcfense of this lawsuit and prosecution 
of her counterclaim ha? hecn frivolous, because as of that date 11-wvey has known 
of the original Isndorvner's (Andersens') inrcnt as stated by Andersens' agent 
Jerry VanOoyen, and Harvcy hasnever obtained my evidence to the contrary of 
the original lando\vner3.r's (Andcrsens') intent. 
As a maner ol.'law, Harvey's Molion to Reconsider is granted. As a matter of law, that 
Conclusion of Law is now modi fied to rcad: 
1 I .  The plaintiSC4 are dcemed to be thc prevailing partics for p u ~ o s c s  of 
IRCT S4(d). I:u~thenore, after no later than February 7.2002, the dale Jwry 
VanOoycn's affidavit was filed IIarveyls dcfense of this lawsuit and prosecution 
ofhcr counterclitiln has bcen frivolous, bccause as ofthat date H~rvey has known 
nfthc original Imdowncr's (Andersens') intent c ~ c  stated by Aoderscns' agent 
Jcrry VanOoyen. and Ilarvey has ncver obtained any evidence to the contrary of 
the original landowner's (Andcrsens') intent. The Idaho Suprcme Court has held 
there i s  an issue of fact, (Read v. Hurvey, 141 Idnho 497, $00, 112 P.3d 785,788 
(2005)) and the Tdaho Supreme Court has read the Affidavit of Jerry Van Ooyen 
(141 Idaho a1 498-99, 112 P.3d a[ 786-87). By operation of ifing v. Amalgumu/ed 
Sugar. 105 Idaho 905,684 P.2d 307 (Ct.App. 1984) and Turner v. Willis. 116 
Idaho 682,778 P 2d SO4 (1989). attorney fees under Idaho Codc $12-121 would 
be improper through and including the remittitur of this action back to the district 
courl Thc rcmittitw was filcd June 2 1,2005 
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111. MOTION 1'0 AMEND INTERIM JUDGMENT. 
h s  a result of this Coul.t's dccision granting Harvey's Motion lo Reconsider, thc motion 
to Amend Intcrim Judgmcnt is Granted The portion of the Interim Judgnlent which rzads. 
.'[aur.tJ?er, thc ColH concludes thdt h t h  the defense of defenhnt, Jennifer Harvcy, and the 
prosecution of her counlerclaim upere frivolous from March 7,2002" is stricken 
Based on the above, Rcads are not entitled to attorncy fees pursuant to r.C $ 12-121 liom 
thc inception orthis lawsuit through the time of remittitur l'his covers ~ a r v e ~ ' s :  prescnt 
abjections as to attorney fees during the appeal and for ofher work done in 2003 (niattersppunding 
hcforc the Idaho Suprcme Court Department ol' Watcr Resources) Defend;tnts Kcsponse and 
Objection to Motion to Pix Costs and Fees, pp. 11 -12. 
R e d s  havc requested aitorncy fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(c). That rule mandates a trial 
court arvard aLtomcys' fees when a party fails to admit a fact in rcsponse lo a Rule 36 request to 
admit, t11at his or her oppvnent is then forced to prove at trial One exception to that mandatory 
atvard of  attorney fees is if Harvey had a "reasonable ground that she might prevail on tile 
matlci.' at trial IS that belief is unresbnable, an awwd of fees under rule 37(c) required. 
C!~~trrernr v Rublrjp: 142 Idaho 573,577, 130 P3d 1 1 1 1, 1 1  15 (2006). 
Rcads argue [hat along with the Court's holding ihat rhc lawsuit \\,as frivolous, Hsn7cy 
~~ri~ngiirlly and sufficient cause denicd several lhcts in her response to "Read's. Rcquest 
for Admissions," which forced thc Reads to prove those facts a[ trial Reads assezt Harvey was 
prcscnt at several of thidepositions taken where she hcard the testimony of several tvitnesses as 
to what the Andersenr intcnded to he the common boundary of the propcrty, yet stillpursued this 
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cause of action even though she llad no "reasonable helicf she would prevail on any of the 
nlatrcrs " PlaintiiTs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order Awarding Fees and ~ ( i s l s ,  
P 
Reads claim they arc entitled to attorneys' fees undcr the rules stated above because 
fIilrvey's claims and prosccution ut'her counterclaim went "beyond frivolous to the point of 
being cnaiicious " W Reads argue Harvey in no way could have had a reasonable belief that 
she would prcvail 011 any of hcr claims she denied in discovery, she faIseIy communicated 
infomation to the expert witnesscs to overcome thc testimony of thc Reads' witnesscs, and s11e 
deceived Mr. VanOoyea into signing an aftidwit that falsely stated the water wvaq flowing in 
another location. R e d s  iirrthcr conter~d Harvey manipulated the testimony ol'her cspeits by 
deceiving thcm when she failcd to reveal what she knew about the excavaion work Keads had 
pmlbrmcd Reads asscrt Harvey failed to show her experts photographs of thc work the Reads 
had done and tlral shc withheld ~Tilical information rrom thcm. Id p 4 Rcads argue H~WCY'S 
denial of "literally ewry request" made in Keads' Request for Admissions, without any re;ryon 
fin doing so excepl io dcccive the p l i e s ,  is grounds for an award of costs and ailornc)~ss' fees 
Id p 8 .  Keads argue Harvey forced the Rcads to incur thousands of doliws ol'legaI cxpense 
knowing she had nothing to support her claims, but still pursued &his inaner beyond summary 
iudgment. Reads asscrt IIarvey's actions therefore entitle them to Iegai expenscs from the date 
sumniary judgmcnt was entered. Id p 9. 
Hawcy cfainis the Reads are atteinpling to supplerne~~r the established record by 
1,roviding copies of depositions and discovery which were not before the Court at trial, and 
thcrcfore should bc disregarded and stricken Defendant's Kesponse and Objection to Motion to  
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Fix Costs and Fees, pp 3-4 ifowever, Harvey cites no rule basis or casc inw For that claim 
.4ccordingly, her objection is overruled 
Harvey argues hcr denials ofthe requcsts made hy the Keads were reasonable aid 
supported by evidence presented at trial, and thcrefore the Reads should not he awarded costs 
and Sees.. Harvey claims the Keads falsely accuscd her ofmisleading her expert witnesses by 
wi\i~hholding imporlilnl information, bur there is nothing in the rccordto indicale thcir opinions 
would have changed had they been awarc of the information Harvey allegedly failed to supply 
Ilarvey's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Rcquests for Admissions were &led 
October 3, 2005. Exhibit G ro Plaintiffs' Memorandum in support of Motion for Order 
Awarding Fees and Costs.. A review of those responses, in addition to the ahovc analysis and rhc 
Court's prior hlelttor;indum Decision, Findings of Fact slnd Candusions of L.du,, shows that front 
October 3,2005, tlirough trial, PIarvey had no "rcasonnbie ground that she might prevail on the 
matter" at trial 
Attorney fecs rclating to requests for admission submitted under 1.R.C.P 36(a) are 
governed by I R.C.P 37(c). Rule 37(c) mandates that a trial court award allorncys' fees when a 
party Sails to admit a fact in R?$onsc to n Rule 36 request that his or her npponcnt is then ibrccd 
to provc at trial. Iiowerer, Rulc 3 7(c) authorizs sanctions only in favor of a piuty who, afrcr a 
rrqucst for admission is denied, later proves the truth of the matter. Puyne v iVallacc, 136 Idaho 
303, 32 p.34695 (Ct. App. 2001) Thc mle is mandatory, subjcct only to the four csceptio~~s set
(1) that the requesl was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(r(); 
(2) that the admission sought was not "~Ssubstantial irnporbii~ce"; 
(3) that i'ailvrc to admit iris based upon a reasonable belief in prevailing on thc 
issuc; or 
(4) other good reason. 
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I R C: P 37(c): Rnge v Posry, 114 Idaho 890,892, 761 P.2d 1242, (Ct.App.TP(IS'). Whether my 
of the exceptions apply is committed to the sound dis~7etion of the distria court. Itugc at 892 
Just as in Ruse, thc first two c~tept io l l~  arc simply not applicable id. Hrtrvcy filed hoilcrplate 
goneral objections to the Reads' Requcsts for Admissions, (Exhibit G to PJaintiffs' 
, . Menlonndum in Support of Motion for Order Awarding Fecs and Costs. pp. I -S), but then 
proceeded to answer most of the Requcsts for Admissions, while posing some $ y ~ j f i c  
objections. . . Thc botton~ ljnc is I I m e y  nnnfcr requested to huve thc Courl rule on those 
objections, and 1.KC.P. 37(c) requires for that exception to appIy, Harvey must have had tbc 
request to admit "held objectionable" What is telling about Ilarvey's objections is that they are 
bascd upon her lack of investigation, to wit: "Ifarvey has not conlplcted her own investigations 
and/or dis'covcry" (Id. p 1); 'SIarvey is wirhout sufficient knowledge or information Lo rcspond 
to this requcst for inlbrnlation tasking her to admit that channel "A" is where water has always 
flo\\*ed and that the water has flowvcd no odrer place than channel "A"], and thereforc denies thc 
sunle" (Id p 6); "Harvcy is wilhout sufficient lcnowledge or information to respond to this 
request for information /asking hw to admit that Andcrsens illtended the centcsline bet~vccn the 
two prcyurtics to be whcrc the wzter fiowcd], aid thcrcfore denies the same". Id. p. 7. Kccp in 
mind that Harvey's mlswors to these Rcqirests to Admit were madc six ycars and one month 
rftur she answcrcci the compli~int and filcd her countcrcluim! h4ore Lhan six years into the 
litigation, md aller she has heen to the ?&aha Court of Appeals a id  ldaIto Supreme Court, and 
gonc through two different attorneys, Hmcy  still "has not completed her own investigations 
and/or discovery", and is "withotd sufficient knowledge or inlbrmation to respond" to these 
rcqquebts lo admit that go to fhc very heart of her defense and countcrclairn. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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As to the second exception under 1 KC.P. 37(c), the above excerpts from thc Requests to 
Adniif and Harvey's response show why cvery single one of the thirty-three Rrqucsts to Ad~nit 
went to the central issues: to this litigation. 
Thc third exception that Ifarvey had a "reasonable bciief in prevailing on the issue". is 
not availablc for several reasons The titst is that as of Octobcr3.2005, six ycars sll~d one month 
into this litigation, Narvy admittedly bad not done any work to even try to scc if she had any 
evidcncc to suppart llcr defense o r  her counterclaim. Ovcr the next year, up until the time of the 
trial in Augus[ 2006. Harvey either made no more effort to try Lo find such evidmcc, or if she did 
make effort, her cfforts were f~uitless. At trial, thc Coun wvondercd how Harvey was going to 
dcfcnd this lawsuit Was she going to be able to find the Andersens to come in and contradict 
VanUoyen? Were hcr attorneys going to be able to cross-cxamine VanOoycn so eff~rively as to 
rendcr him not credible? Were there othcr witnesses wvho wcre going to testie that in 1972 thc 
creclc ran somewhere clse? While Harvcy's counsel hinted suchmight occur (on the first day of 
trial he argued in rcsponse to Reads' Motion to Exclude Expert Tes(i:nony that VanOnyen was 
not the grantor, thc Andersens werc the grantor and thc deed creates ambiguity). None of these 
s c e ~ ~ x i o s  occurred 1i;trvey provided no contrarp proof of Anderscns' intent She had no prooi' 
that Va~lOoycn UTLS not Andcrsens' agent. Harvey had no reasonable beliei'in prevailing on her 
defense or her counterclaim. I-larvey claims in Defendant's Rcsponse and Objection to Motion 
to Fix Costs and Fees, pagcs 14-15, that "Ms. Harvey had reasomblc grounds for believing that 
she might prevail at (rial on hcr position thal thc boundary helwecn her property and thc Keads' 
U~~LY ihc natural channel of Little Gold Creek, not the manmadc channel A." Id p 14. (emphasis 
addcd) IIaneey's choice of wods arc telling Idaho Rule of Civil Procedurc 37(c) does not rcad 
"that raiiurc to admit was bsscd upon a reasonable belieithat onc might prevail on the issue': i t  
MEMOKANDUM DECISION AND ORDEK Page I5 
reads "that failure to admit was based up011 a reasonable belief in prevailing on thc isstre " 
Il~rvey's arguments convcnientiy ignore the "issue" requested to be admitted The ''issue" as 
liamed hg mo?ji all of thc Rrqucsts ibr Adtnissioii, arc that the walcr flowcd in Channel 'A" at 
a11 times percincnt to this litigation (since 1972 and ever since tliat time), and that b7 I972 when 
the properly xas subdividcd by Andersens it was their intent that the boundaries run to this 
Channcl A ivhcre ihc creek was running. ~ o r v ~ ~ a r g u e s  sh  was re&onable in her denial 
bcwusc "the Supsemc Court clearly found that therc was a genuinc issue of mt~terid liact as to 
whether the boundary should be the now-relatively dry naluraI stream channel, or Choitncl A " 
Id .  p. I4 Ilrrrvcy completely ignores that whether U I ~  Supreme Court found there to be an issue 
of matcrial ract regarding samc historical dry stream channel has nothing to do with what she 
xva% bcing askcd to admit, ie . that in 1972 water flowed in Channel ';4", only in Channel "A" 
and that Channel "n': is what the hndersens intended to bc the houndicry when they subdivided 
in 1972. Hanvy's remaining reasons why her deninls wcre based upon "a reasonable belief in 
p r e ~ ~ i i i i ~ g  upon (I1c issue" likewisc ignore the "issue" sought to bc admitted. Harvey claims she 
had cvidencc of Rcads' drcdging in the 1990's. that &ads altered the flow of the char~trel and 
that sohe of the ofhcr deeds referenced "drainage ditch" and "creek" None ofthose has a thing 
to do with what Harvey was being asked to admit, and that was tlre fact that in 1972 water 
flowed in Chsnnel "A", only in Channel "A" and that Clrannel "A" is what the AndersMs 
intcnded to be rhc boundary when they subdivided in 1972 
For all the reasons set foorth above, the fourth exception, s imc "other goort rcason". is not 
avitilablr to Harvey.. 
Reads we awarded their altorney fecs against Nxvcy from Ocfobcr 3,2005, (the date of 
1I;lrvcy's Responses to PlaintiKs' First Sel of Requcsts ior Admissions) to the prcsent under 
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1 K.C.P. 37 nlis Court finds none of Hamay's "objections" were "held ob,jcctionable pursuant 
to Ru1c 3G(d)", the admissions souglit were "of substantial imporlance", Harvey's failure to 
admit \$as not based upon a "rcasonahlc belief in prevailing ohthe issues", and therc was no 
other "good reason" Tor Harvey's failurc to admit said Kequests for Admissions Counsel Tor 
Reads is instructed to submit the amount of those fees in a proposed final judgment. 
This Court has rcviewed the Affidavit (if Charles K. Dean in Support or Attorney Fees 
and Costs. While h4r. Dean docs not set forth thc criteriaof 1.RC.P.. 54(e)(3KA)-U.) in that 
order, he provides sufficient infori~ration for the Court to analyze his &aim for allorney kcs on 
behalf of thc Ke;tds. Regarding (A), this Coun finds the timc ond labor required since October 3, 
2005, to hercasonable ond a neuual factor in this analysis.. Criteria (B) i s  a neutral factor as the 
que3tions involivrd in this lii\vsuit werc neither novel or difficult Criteria (C): the skill requisite 
to pcrfoml thc iegnl scrvice properly and the experience and ability o r  the atumcy in thc 
pitrti~~lar lield of law, is a neutral factor. ~ri imia (D), the prevailing charges Cor like work has 
the cffecl of callsing an increasc in the amount of fees requested. Mr. Dcan kept his ratcs at $150 
per how bccausc he "felt sorry for thc Reads and the outrageous amount of lime I was forced to 
spcnd in a case wllcre the ultimate result was so clear", but in 2006 raised those ratcs to $1 75 fix 
the Reads. Affidavit ol'CharIes R Dean, 31, in Support of Atto~~ley Fees and C o s t s , , ~  1-2. 
This Coun finds that thc prevailing rate in this arca for an attorney with 28 years of experience in 
real estate nlattcrs (Id., p. 1) Lo bc in excess of $200 per hour. Accordingly, this Court will grant 
a 1056 increasc in the amount charged to Reab by Mr. Dcan. Ciitcria (E) is neutral 6s this fee of 
Mr. L)eai's was nailhcr fixad nor contingent Rcgnrding criteria (F)), the Court has been made 
atstire of no time Iimiticlions imposcd by lfic client, but finds the "cjrcumstances ofthe case" 
jusrifyall hours chargcd by Mr. Dean. Illis Court agrecs with Mr. Dean that the hours sperit on 
MEhlORANDUM DECISlON AND ORDCR 
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the c a e  werc the dircct result of Ms Harvey's failure to admit the Requests to Admit, and this 
Ctrurt finds Harvey's continued defense and counterclaim was based on nothing mortr than the 
slrained slatutory interpretation sei Fa& in Parl 11 above Criteria (G) is neutral regarding the 
amount invoIved and the rcsr~lts obtained Certainly if somcone is trying to take your land and 
pour access lo a creek, one \\.auld expect them to aggressively dcfend Rcads wcre successful in 
tbaL dcfense Criteria (H), the undesirability ofthe case, is a lkctor which should cause an 
upward deyarturc of I'ees from that requested. T%c case was undesirable hecause Harvey was 
being unreasonable aid frivolaus in her defcnse. Wllile an attorney appreciates the work on an 
hourly basis, in order tcr fulfill his or her ethical obligations and to foster future business, he or 
she would alsc, like to achieve the desired result with a minimum expcGe to thc client. 'Ihis 
Court facton; in Ulis ttpward departure irom amounts clain~cd with (hc 10% increase sct fo?h 
abovc. Criteria. 0) is neutral, as to the nature and leng~h of the professional relationship wi& the 
client. Sincc the work perlnmd was on an hourly basis, criteria (J) is neutral as "awardrt in 
similar rxses" is essentially covered by the analysis in criteria (A), the "time and labor 
required'', since the Court has determined the hours spent after October 3,2005, werc reasonable 
Critcria (K) is not a factor ;r< no request for computer-assisted legal research was madc This 
Court fin& no criteria (L) fktors ("any other Iacton'3 apply. 
The Court has totaled the hours and hourly rate charged to Reads by Mr. Dean fivm 
October 3: 2005, to Seprdber 6, 2006, as shown on Exhibit I and Exliibit 2 to (he Affidavit of 
Charlm R. Dean, k. in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Thosc amounts total 
%24,lSR..50 Uecausc of the rclativdy low hourly rate given Mr. Deal's experience and the 
undesirable nature of the case, I.R.C.P. S4(cf(S)(D) and (El), an increase of fen pcrcent 
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($2,415 00) is added, bringing rhe~total attorney k c  award to $26,573.50. Counsel fix Reads is 
instructed to includc that fee runoun( allowed in a proposed linal judment. 
V- COSTS. 
R e d s  have rcqurstcd costs ia the amount ofS3.883.17. This Court's rcview of the 
charges that make up that total show they are costs as a mattcr of right under I RR. P. 
S4(d)(l)(C). Hivve)' argucs that "many of these costs. ..claimed by tlie Reads perlain to the 
appeal belbrerhe Idaho Couri of Appeilis and the ldaho Supreme Coun" (but not speciCying 
wllich costs) and thal some @ut again without spcdfying which) costs are discretionary. 
Defendant's Response and Objection to Motion to Fix Costs and Fees, p. 2. First of all, the 
ldiiho Suprcms Court awsnled costs to Tircrvcy in its decision and in the reminitur and as 
s~bscqr~et~t iy  ordcred by this Coun on December 2,2005. It is unknoum if the Sddaho Court of 
Appcals awarded coats against Harvey that me duplicated in Reads' prescnt request.. Second, 
this Court finds no discretionary costs have been ~ r c s e ~ t l y  claimed by Rcruis.. All costs 
requested by Rcads r\t prescnt ore costs as a matter of right and are proper u111c.s~ they have 
prcvitlusiy hecn ordered by the Idaho Court oSAppeals and pxviously paid by Harvey. lo the 
cxtent any of thesc costs chimed have already been awarded by the Idaho Court of Appcds and 
have been paid by kIarvey, no duplication of awnrded cosls will be allo~vcd. 
Counsel for Reads is ilistruded to include thesc costs d l o ~ e d  in a proposcd final 
judgment 
I 
I 
1 
hlEMOfUNDUM DEClSION AND OWER 
VI. ORDER. 
IT 1s HEREBY ORDERED II;tr$ry7s Motion for Reconsideration and Modon to 
Amcnd Intcrim Judpcnt are WANTED to the extent set Corth above; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERXD Reads' Motion to Fix Costs and Fees is GRANTED Lo 
the extent all costs sougl~t (unless previously awarded by the Idaho Courl of AppcaIs and 
previously paid by Kasvcy) are awardcd us rcquestcd in Reads' Memorandum of Costs and Pees 
and lo the extcnt attorney's fees are sought from October 3,2005, to the present. Unle.~ there is 
duplication, lhose approved costs as a matter of right total $3,883.1 7. Attorney fees are awarded 
in the amount of $26,57350. Counsel Cot Reads shall prepare a final judgment inoliiding that 
amount of atlorney fws and the appropriate anlount of costs (subtncting any duplication lrom 
any award of costs by the idaho Cow[ of Appeals and prior paymcnt or those costs by I-Tarvey) 
IT IS FUR'rBER ORDERED that the September 1,2006 Memorandum Decision, 
Findings ofFacf and ConcIusions o f ~ a w  is MENDED to add Conclusion of T.aw 12, which 
reads.. 
12. Reads are awarded their attorney fees against Harvey from October 3,2005, (the date 
ofHarveySs Responsas to Plaintiffs' First Set of Rcquests for Admissions) Lo the present 
uildcr LR.C.P 37 This Court finds. 1) Iiarvey's objections were not "held 
objcctionable" by this Court; 2) the admissions sought wcre "of substantial importance"; 
3) Harvey's failure to admit was not based upon a reasonable helief in prevailing on the 
issues, and 4) ihcre was no other good reason for Harvey's failure to admil said Rcquests 
for Admissions. Accordingly, attorney fees froltl Octobcr 3,2005, lo the prcsent are 
tnanJatory undcr I.R.C.P. 57. The amount of such fees under an LRC.P. 54(e)(3) 
analysis is $26,573.50. Reads are awarded cvsts as P matter of right undcr 1.R C P. 
54(d)(l)(C) in tbe mount of $3,883.1 7 (unless my of that amount is included in costs 
awarded by the Idaho Court and previously paid by Harvey). Rcads' counsel shall 
include such attorney fces and costs in a proposed finaljudgn~cnt. 
DATED this 19"' day of Dccembcr, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTlFY that on this -ay of Decembei, 2006, I caused a true 
and corrcct copy of the foregoing h1EMOIUNL)UM DECSION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR KECONSIDERATTON AND MOTION TO AMEND 
INTERiM JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR OrWEK AWARDING FEES 
AM) COSTS to be served by facsimile to thc follotving 
Charles R. Dean, Jr Scott L. Campbell 
DEAN R: KOLTS MOFFATT, WOMAS, RAWTT, ROCK & 
2020 Lakewood Dr.. Suito 212 F~ELDS, CIIAK~EED 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 101 S. Capital Rlvd., 10th Floor 
(208) 664-9844 Post Office Box 829 
Boise, ldrho 8370 1 
Fax (208) 385-5384 
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A' AACHMENT #3 - GLAHE SURVEt 
GLAHE & ASSOCIATES 
Professional Land Surveyors Professional Engineers 
303 Church St., Ste. A P.O. Box 1863 
Sandpoint, LlJ 83864 
Phone: (208) 265-4474 ' Fax: (208) 265-0675 
P i e r r e  Bordenave,  In terMounta in  Resource  
September 17,200 1 
RE: Harvey  Affidavi 
25 Februa ry  2002 
Jennifer Harvey 
213 Winterbmy Way 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
RE: East boundary of Warranty Deed Doc. No. 433901 described as center line of the main hibutary to Gold 
Creek located in 512, T58N. Rl W BM 
TASK: Locate east boundary of Warranty Deed Doc. NO. 433901 in questionable drainage area 
Dear Jennifer. 
Early last Fall you hired our firm to mearch and do a topographic survey in the questionable drainage area of 
your east boundary. 
In our research of deeds, we found yovr eastboundarywas originated in Doc No. 144550, dated 10RS/Z, 
being the senior deed out of the W %  of Section 12, TSIIN, RI W EM, calling out the exirting creek, cwter of 
the main tributary to Gold Creek. 
Yau purchased your land under Warranty DeLd Doc. NO. 433901, dated 10115/93. which desqiixs your east 
boundaw l i e  basicallv the same as it did in Doc. N a  144550. lhere have bcen several ownenhio chmres ir! 
the 20 yearr; between i0r2sfl2 and 1011Sl93, but the dsxiptiaa of your east line never changed. ' 
We siarted the field survey in Novemba 2000 when the high grm was gone and theground was dry and 
frozw enouch to pick up the maior drainages in the area of dispute. We found that most of the drainaxes haw 
- .  
been man made in the &empt t i  drain the-flat meadow area, &ch seldom flooded during spring nm& We 
also found areas where the historic nabnal drainage was east ofthe man made ditdres as shown in our swey. 
In the spring of 2001 during spring nmoff we flew over the area in disp* and took some photos that clearly 
show the man made drainages and the hirtasicdrainage flowing during nniofi 
It is difficult to determine *ere the center tine of& main trrautary to Gold Geck was on iW2Sm when the 
narcel war crcaEeb hut it ir, dtarlvnot the man made C i s  cammd &a &s decd was ucaxch I 4 d  
~msounend that you and me om& of ihe parcrls to the &YBU ~ibmdgly 0th- than th: 
Enclosed arc some exhibits fhatmight clcar up tho dclerminaiion ofyour east boundary line. 
A. Cunent Bonner County ownership map. 
B. Legal Descriptions and i n d e ~  
C. Glahe2001 survey 
D. Spring 2001 photos 
E. 1951 quad showing creek more easterly 
F. 1989 quad different than 1951 quad 
: 
G. Attemptedoverlay of 1989 digital quad over GIahe2OOO survey 
' .  
Sincerely, 
L.A. Glahe. P.L.S. 
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1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years old and as I have personal knowledge of the facts 
and circumstances ofthis matter and is testifying herein based upon that knowledge and 
am competent to testifj to the matters contained herein. 
2. I am a retired real estate broker and currently reside in Sagle, Idaho. 
3. In 1972 I was retained by Dick A. Anderson and Nancy L. Anderson, husband and wife, 
to assist them in the subdivision and mwketing of property they owned in Bonner County, 
Idaho that is located in the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Qmer of the Northeast 
Quarter of Section I1 and the Northwest Q&er of Section 12, T o m h i p  58 Nofih, 
Range 1 West of the Boise Meridian (the Anderson Property). 
4. The Andersoas subdivided the AndersonProperty into fourteen (14) separate parcels 
ranging from 9 to 17 acres, more or less. In connection with my marketing efforts, I drew 
a diagram of the subdivision which identified the parcels by number and approximate size. 
A true and conect copy of said diagram is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is 
incorporated herein by reference (the marketing diagram). 
5. The legal descriptions of most of the parcels shown on Exhiit A (all except Parcels 2,9 
and 13) used the centerline of the main channel of Little ~ b l d  Creek as a bound~uy of the 
subdivided lots. The main channel ofLittle Gold Creek traversed the Anderson Property. 
It is my understanding at the time that I made the marketing diagram that the main channel 
of Little Gold Creek was a naturally occurring water channel and not a man made ditch 
At the time that I was involved in the marketing ofthe Anderson Property, the Anderson 
Property was also traversed by a linear rnan made drainage ditch. The man made drainage 
ditch was located westerly of the main channel of Little Gold Creek and the main channel 
of Little Gold Creek lay easterly of the linear man made drainage ditch. 
6 .  Depicted on the marketing diagram are Lots 6 and 10. Lot 6 generally corresponds with 
the SW1/4 of the NW114 of the NW114 of Township 58 North, Range 1 West ofthe 
Boise Meridian and Lot 10 generally corresponds with SE1/4 ofthe NW114 of the 
NW1/4, Township 58 North, Range 1 West of the Boise Meridian which traversed the 
Anderson Property. At the time that the marketing diagram was made, I relied almost 
exclusively on aerial photographs. My f w a r i t y  of the physical topography of the 
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Anderson Properly, particularly as it relates to the main channel ofLittle Gold Creek was 
limited due to the fact of the heavily vegetated meadow created difliculties in actuauy 
walking the Anderson Property for the establishment of the boundary lines. For example, 
when I created the marketing diagram there was some uncertainty as to the approximate 
location of the main channel of Little Gold Creek (as the marketing diagram states, the 
"sketch below is made solely for the purppses of assisting in locating said premises and 
[my company] assumes no fiability for variations, if any, in and location 
ascertained by actual survey'). Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a another copy of the 
marketing diagram. I have circled on the diagram an area of uncertainty as to the location 
of a portion of the main channel of Little Gold Creek in relation to the common boundary 
between Parcels 10 and 6. Pursuant to the marketing diagram, the line with the 'X' (near 
the common comers of Parcels 10,6,11 and 3) which is the most easterly of the two lines 
circled, indicates what I believed to be the main channel ofLittle Gold Creek at the time I 
created the marketing diagram as between Parcels 10 and 6. Note that on Exhibits A and 
B there is a marked "x" placed on the easterly water route which I placed there when I 
faxed the marketing diagram to Ms. Harvey in 1997. Ail& I made the originaI marketing 
diagram John Engwer (the person who originally chained and compassed the Anderson 
Property for the Andersons) indicated to me that Little Gold Creek was actuauy farther 
east than originally drawn and I thereafter made the change to the marketing diagram and 
made a footnote regarding the change on the bottom of the marketing diagram prior to 
faxing the same to Ms. Harvey in 1997. I now see that this footnote and x were missing 
Eom the marketing diagram slier submitted to the Court by the Reads. I have also 
noted on Exhibit B the general location of the linear man nude ditch referenced above. At 
the t'me that I went out to the subject property with Ms. Read, as referenced in Paragraph 
6 of my &st affidavit, the difficulty of traversing the terrain was again present and at that 
time Ms. Read and I walked through grasses in excess of five (5) feet and more in height 
in an attempt to match the Tucker Survey with the boundary lines set forth on the 
marketing diagam. ( c ,y--De 
x O O ~  
7. I have made an earlier affidavit in this matter signed on January 4 , W .  All ofthe 
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statements contained therein are tme EXCEPT for two areas requir'ig clarification 
relating to the statements contained in Paragraphs 4 and 7 thereof. 
8. In in paragraph 4 of my first affidavit I state "[tlhat the location and direction of flow of 
that main cbatu1el1 is shown on Exhibit A by the line with arrows b e g W g  to the north of 
parcel 4 and ending to the south of parcel 1." While generally correct, that statement did 
not take into account the discrepancy npted in Paragraph 6, above. The ''~"notation on 
the easterly line was not disclosed on the marketing diagram that was originally submitted 
to the Court by the Reads nor was the change noted in Paragraph 4 of my original 
affidavit. After making the 'Y' 1 did not draw little arrows on the second line, which 
explains why there are nor arrows on that line. This shows the change that I had made, 
othenvise it would be hard to tell the diierence between the two hes. 
9. I have noted a mistake in paragraph 7 of my first affidavit, pursuant to the my first 
affidavit I stated that channel "A" as depicted on the Tucker Survey was the main channel 
of Little Gold Creek and that channel "B" was a ditch through which the main channel of 
Little Gold Creek never flowed. This is incorrect due to transposition of the letters. 
What is correct is  that channel "B" is what 1 have always considered to be the main 
channel of Little Gold Creek and that channel "A" is  the linear man made ditch 
referenced above. Channel "B" as depicted on the Tucker Suwey is the boundary I 
pointed out to prospective purchasers oftbe Anderson Property. At the time ofmy 
first &davit, the substance ofthe same was provided to the Reads' attorney via telephone 
and 1 do not recall having the Tucker survey in my hand at the time ofthe telephonic 
interview nor recall seeing a copy of the same at the time I signed ofFon the affidavit. 
There was apparently a miscomdcation~mismderstand'u1g as to what I considered to be 
the diich and the main channel of Little Gold Creek as depicted on the Tucker survey and 
which such miscomdcationlmisunderstan'~~g was later incorporated into the iinal 
version of my first affidavit. In order to avoid the same 
~com~ca t iodmisunde r s t andmg  in this affidavit I have initialed all of the exhibits 
referenced herein and have reviewed the same prior to signing off on this affidavit. 
10. In the last few weeks I have met personally with Jennifer Harvey regarding the boundary 
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line dispute that is the subject ofthis lawsuit. For the first time I inspected several maps in 
conjunction with the marketing diagram along with aerial photographs, photographs Eom 
the ground and the Tucker survey, a true and correct copy ofwhich is attached hereto as 
Exhiit C and incorporated herein by reference as we8 as the topographic survey created 
by Glahe and Associates, a true and correct copy of the same is attached hereto as Exhibit 
D and incorporated herein by reference, 
1 1. Attached hereto as Exhiit E md incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct 
copy of the Exhibit D with additional notatioh. Based upon my recollection, my physical 
inspection of the reai property that is the subject of this lawsuit and Exhibits A, B, C and 
D I believe that: 
a. The circled area on Exhrit E generally corresponds with the circled area noted on 
Exhiiit B. The area circled on Exhihit E depicts what I understood to be the 
common boundary line between Lots 10 and G with the aforementioned 
discrepancy. 
b. The hatched line on Exhibit E corresponds to ChannelB on the Tucker survey and 
which I understood to be the main channel of ~ i n l e  Gold Creek at the time that I 
made the marketing diagram and which I pointed out to prospective purchasers of 
the Anderson Property. 
c. The "x'd" line on Exhibit E corresponds to Channei A on the Tucker survey and 
which is the man made ditch referenced above and which I understood not to be 
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the common boundary h e a t  the time that I made the marketing diagram. 
DATED this h a y  of June, 2002. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWO to before me, 
Puhb for the State ofldaho this z d a Y  
f 
. .. . . . . . 
. % . / ,  
?- :. 
.. .. ,,'. 
.,I ...: 
~ . ,  
: :.' , ,,. I. 
... 
8 .  
. . 
- . .:.; 2. , ., ., . ,, 
<:,.:* . 
. . . .  . " '  ",. . ' 
- .  
.- . 
. .. 
- . 
. .. 
- .  
- .  
.. . i.. . , .  . .. : 
. . 5 8: .'.. : .. . . .. . : 
> . .  
., 5,c '.. . :... ,,<: ;: 
. . 
,,,.) .. ...,. .. 
* .  : 
-,. . ..I. CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE 
" r.. .el ,.-. , ... 
I, EDWIN B. HOLMES a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify that 
on the &day of June, 2002,I served, or caused to have served, a true and correct copy of the 
foxegoing document upon the following person(s) via [ 1 &st class mail, postage prepaid; 
. . 
-; andlorrnand delivery: 
CHARLS3S R DEAN, JR 
DEAN & DEAN 
601 SHERMAN AVE., SUITE 2 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814 
FACSIMILE: 664-9844 
JUDGE MITCElELL 
ilict CW: 
EDWIN B. HOLMES 
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